



VOL 17

**SIMULATION, EIGENZEIT
AND CIVILIZATIONAL CRISIS**

TIMOTHY SPEED

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**Simulation, Eigenzeit
and Civilizational Crisis**

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Simulation, Eigenzeit and Civilizational Crisis

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Abstract

The present volume investigates the growing tension between emergent forms of world-binding and a society increasingly organizing reality through stabilization, simulation, administrative legibility, and functional reproducibility. Its point of departure is the observation that modern systems have developed enormous capacities for control, prediction, and technical organization, while simultaneously placing under increasing pressure precisely those conditions necessary for real emergence, embodied world-relation, long-term coherence, and open-ended processes of knowledge formation.

At the center of the volume lies the concept of *operatoric world-binding*. Cognition is not understood primarily as the processing of representations within already stabilized systems, but as an irreversible process of relational condensation through which world itself becomes bound, displaced, and reorganized. From this perspective, knowledge does not appear as static possession or mere information processing, but as something that can only emerge within *Eigenzeit*, movement, conflict, difference, and recursive stabilization.

The investigations assembled here bring together neurodivergent epistemology, labour critique, emergence theory, systems analysis, artistic research, and institutional field research. The volume argues that many phenomena currently interpreted as individual dysfunctions or psychological deficits — including work incapacity, communicative mismatch, overcomplexity, withdrawal, institutional escalation, or recursive conflict dynamics — may instead point toward deeper structural incompatibilities between different modes of societal world-organization.

Particular attention is given to forms of *eigenzeit*-bound cognition that remain only partially compatible with modern institutional regimes organized around standardization, reversibility, administrative control, and simulation-based productivity. Within this framework, neurodivergent forms of perception and cognition appear not merely as individual deviations, but potentially as contact zones in which suppressed conditions of emergence, irreversibility, and real world-formation become visible again.

The investigations draw upon long-term autoethnographic research conducted across labour systems, institutional conflicts, artistic practice, neurodivergent embodiment, and recursive theory production. The volume therefore deliberately operates within a boundary zone between personal experience, theoretical condensation, and structural analysis. Conflict, emotional intensity, institutional friction, overload, and

destabilization are not treated merely as subjective disturbances external to knowledge production, but as part of the empirical field itself.

At the same time, the volume critiques an increasingly simulation-based organization of society in which reality becomes progressively managed through statistical models, algorithmic prediction, administrative abstraction, and functional controllability. The investigations propose that modern societies may thereby gradually lose the capacity to integrate real difference, open emergence, and forms of human existence that cannot be fully formatted into simulation-compatible structures. Contemporary conflicts surrounding neurodivergence, labour, psychological exhaustion, social fragmentation, institutional violence, and AI-driven governance therefore appear not as isolated crises, but as expressions of a deeper conflict between emergent world-formation and simulative stabilization.

The volume explicitly rejects both closed explanatory systems and universalizing claims. The concepts developed here function instead as heuristic operatoric structures intended to render visible tensions that appear to be intensifying within modern societies. At the center of the investigations lies the question of what happens when societies increasingly organize their stability through simulation while simultaneously losing the open, irreversible, and embodied processes from which real world-binding emerges in the first place.

Keywords: operatoric world-binding, eigenzeit, simulation-based society, neurodivergence, autism, ADHD, AuDHD, emergent world-formation, stabilization, recursive condensation, structural incompatibility, process cognition, operatoric cognition, enactivism, world-capability, simulation override, institutional conflict, epistemic violence, labour ontology, neurodivergent epistemology, relational ontology, systems theory, emergence, irreversibility, world-formation, morphogenesis, embodied cognition, administrative stabilization, AI and society, crisis of stabilization, civilizational crisis, recursive conflict dynamics, world-binding, relational condensation, non-representational cognition, process ontology, emergent labour, neurodivergent labour, institutional incompatibility, epistemic conflict, operatoric invariance, retrospective stabilization, simulation versus world-binding, functional stabilization, operatoric profiles, generative ontology, social complexity, temporal organization, metastability, relational coupling, recursive destabilization, post-representational cognition, embodied world-relation, irreversible emergence, simulation and embodiment, emergent knowledge formation, operatoric emergence, cognitive morphology, labour critique, disability studies, autistic epistemology, artistic research, neurodivergent embodiment, institutional violence, procedural violence, epistemic exclusion, crisis of world-binding, societal stabilization, simulation-based governance, emergent reorganization, relational world-formation, world-organization, structural

recurrence, recursive world-building, ontological incompatibility, complexity reduction, stabilization society, AI governance, morphogenetic processes, processual world-binding, recursive form-formation, eigenzeit-bound cognition, structural tension, simulation-driven society

Contents

Simulation, Eigenzeit and Civilizational Crisis.....	3
Abstract.....	3
Introduction.....	5
Work under Eigenzeit: On the Structure of Eigenzeit-Based Binding and Its Incompatibility with Functional Work Regimes.....	8
Thinking in Formation: On a Form of Cognition That Produces Knowledge in Process	15
Operatoric Eigenzeit Profiles: Structural Incompatibility, Recursive Conflict Dynamics, and Emergent World-Binding.....	45
Operatoric World-Binding and the Crisis of Stabilization - Neurodivergence, Emergence, and the Limits of Simulation-Based Society.....	76

Introduction

The investigations assembled in the present volume emerge from a growing tension increasingly visible across modern societies: the conflict between emergent forms of world-binding and societal systems that organize reality ever more strongly through stabilization, simulation, prediction, standardization, and administrative reproducibility. While earlier volumes of the *Operatoric Research Corpus* developed many of the ontological, epistemological, and socio-political foundations underlying these investigations, the present section marks a further condensation. The focus increasingly shifts away from isolated domains toward the recursive relations connecting cognition, temporality, institutional organization, technological stabilization, and emergent world-formation itself.

What becomes visible is a structural tension reproducing itself across highly different societal fields with remarkable similarity. Comparable conflicts emerge within labour systems, scientific institutions, welfare regimes, neurodivergent life trajectories, administrative structures, AI-driven governance, and processes of cultural and technological stabilization. What appears here is not merely a collection of isolated social problems, but a deeper conflict between different modes of organizing reality itself.

Modern societies increasingly tend to stabilize reality through representation, statistical modelling, algorithmic prediction, and administrative legibility. Processes are expected

to remain measurable, controllable, and functionally reproducible wherever possible. Knowledge is progressively transferred into informational environments optimized for comparability, predictability, and reversibility. Simultaneously, however, precisely those forms of cognition, labour, embodiment, and social existence that depend upon open emergence, relational condensation, irreversible coupling, and recursive destabilization increasingly come under pressure.

The present investigations approach these tensions through the concept of *operatoric world-binding*. Cognition is not understood primarily as the processing of representations within already stabilized worlds, but as an ongoing process through which world itself becomes bound, displaced, reorganized, and condensed. From this perspective, the world does not appear as a fully given order in advance, but as something repeatedly brought forth through relational processes. Processes leave traces. Relations condense into worlds.

Within this framework, *Eigenzeit* does not merely designate subjective time experience, but the temporal structure of irreversible world-formation itself. Every real coupling alters the conditions of further coupling. Every stabilization transforms the space of future possibilities. Emergence therefore does not simply describe the appearance of novelty within already existing systems, but irreversible condition-shift. Knowledge does not emerge outside such processes, but within movement, difference, conflict, and recursive stabilization.

From this perspective, many contemporary conflicts surrounding neurodivergence, labour incapacity, institutional escalation, social fragmentation, or epistemic exclusion begin to appear differently. Characteristics commonly interpreted as dysfunctions or maladjustments may instead point toward structural incompatibilities between different modes of societal world-organization. Highly stabilized systems frequently optimize for simulation, reversibility, standardization, and administratively securable productivity, whereas eigenzeit-bound forms of cognition operate more strongly through relational condensation, emergent reorganization, and irreversible coupling.

The present volume therefore does not investigate neurodivergence merely as a diagnostic category or identity position. Neurodivergent boundary profiles appear here instead as possible contact zones in which suppressed tensions of modern reality organization become visible. The question is not simply why certain individuals experience difficulties within existing systems. Increasingly, the material examined here suggests that different operative forms of world-organization themselves collide with one another.

At the same time, the investigations assembled here do not claim to provide a closed explanatory system or universal theory. Nor do they seek to romanticize neurodivergence, instability, suffering, or conflict. The concepts developed throughout the volume function instead as heuristic operatoric structures intended to render visible recurring tensions between stabilization and emergence, simulation and embodiment,

reversibility and irreversible world-binding. The analyses proceed experimentally, recursively, and often from within the very conflict zones they attempt to understand.

This methodological position remains central. The investigations emerge not solely from detached observation, but from long-term involvement within institutional conflicts, labour crises, neurodivergent embodiment, artistic research, and recursive theory production. Affect, exhaustion, friction, overload, escalation, and destabilization are therefore not treated merely as subjective disturbances external to knowledge production, but as part of the empirical field itself. At the same time, the volume explicitly condenses for the first time the epistemic and operatoric dynamics underlying the broader research program of the *Operatoric Research Corpus* itself.

Simultaneously, the volume situates these dynamics within a broader historical transformation. The expansion of algorithmic governance, generative AI systems, data-driven optimization, and simulation-based administrative infrastructures intensifies tendencies already deeply embedded within modern stabilization societies. Reality increasingly becomes organized through informational closure, statistical abstraction, and anticipatory control. Difference appears less and less as a condition of emergence and increasingly as a risk to system stability. Under such conditions, open-ended relational processes become progressively more difficult to sustain.

The resulting conflict cannot be reduced to technology alone. Technological systems instead amplify tendencies already present within modern forms of societal organization themselves. What becomes visible is a growing displacement of embodied relational world-binding by forms of stabilization increasingly detached from direct existential coupling to reality. This development affects not only labour and administration, but also science, education, politics, social integration, and contemporary understandings of human value itself.

The investigations collected in this volume therefore revolve around the possibility that modern societies may increasingly be entering a deeper crisis of world-capability. The problem may not consist solely in political polarization, technological acceleration, economic instability, or institutional overload considered separately. More fundamentally, modern societies may gradually be losing the capacity to integrate real difference, irreversible emergence, and forms of existence that cannot be fully translated into simulation-compatible structures.

The following studies investigate different aspects of this tension. Beginning with questions of labour, cognition, and processual world-binding, the analysis gradually expands toward broader examinations of institutional stabilization, recursive conflict dynamics, simulation-based governance, and civilizational transformation.

At the center of these investigations remains a recurring question:

What happens to societies when stabilization increasingly replaces world-formation itself?

Work under Eigenzeit: On the Structure of Eigenzeit-Based Binding and Its Incompatibility with Functional Work Regimes

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Abstract

The present contribution develops the concept of eigenzeit-based binding as a fundamental condition of work capacity. Its point of departure is the author's observation of his own work capacity as a neurodivergent person, through which it becomes visible that certain forms of world-relation can only operate under conditions of self-organized, coherent temporal structures. In such cases, perception, action, and world-relation are not separate from one another, but arise synchronously in eigenzeit-bound processes of world-building.

On the basis of the analytically framed individual case of the author, it is shown that under conditions of external control, fragmented work organization, and externally imposed causality, systematic breakdowns of function occur. These do not manifest merely as overload or adaptation problems, but as a loss of the capacity to act itself. In particular, it is argued that institutional constructions of the German welfare state, such as the *Bedarfgemeinschaft*, establish an external nexus of effect and causality that delegitimizes and blocks eigenzeit-bound forms of work.

This reveals a fundamental rupture in the architecture of work, resulting from the incompatibility of different forms of world-relation within modern work regimes, even if this dynamic in its pronounced form does not apply to all neurodivergent constellations.

The contribution thus shifts the dominant perspective from individual deficits to a structural analysis of work regimes. It shows that work capacity cannot be generally presupposed, but is bound to specific conditions of coherence. From this follows the necessity to conceive of work not as functional execution, but as an eigenzeit-bound form of world-building.

The contribution thereby formulates an approach within the theory of work that makes visible the structural limits of externally determined forms of work as well as their systematic negative effects.

Keywords: Eigenzeit, temporal coherence, world-relation, world-building, work as world-building, enactive cognition, neurodivergence, monotropism, theory of work, labor ontology, structural incompatibility, administrative time, welfare systems, coherence-dependent cognition

1. Introduction

Modern work regimes implicitly assume that work capacity is a general, context-independent property of subjects. Deviations from this norm are typically described as individual deficits, for example within psychological or medical models. This perspective, however, overlooks the fact that work itself is bound to specific structural conditions.

Profit is not equivalent to meaningfulness, and formatting and acceleration are not equivalent to quality. In dominant economic contexts, there is generally a high tolerance for these inconsistencies, which is often entirely absent in certain forms of world-relation. In the conventional sense of Western economies, work is a predefined format which, as a job, creates a framework in which as many different individuals as possible can perform an activity with nearly identical outcomes and are then monetarily compensated as an exchange for their expenditure of energy and lifetime. This logic, combined with recognition, status, and social integration, follows mechanisms that tend to place value over effect, status over authenticity, teamwork over the pointing out of contradictions, and income over consequences. One primarily aligns oneself with the productivity of society, which, as an abstract entity, is assumed—with all its claims and assumptions—to be more or less meaningful, just, and coherent.

Certain neurodivergent constellations, however, exhibit a structure in which these causalities between self-perception and external assertion are not stably mirrored. What emerges here is not an alternative value judgment, but a form of perception in which inconsistencies appear immediately as such and cannot be functionally ignored. This gives rise to an experiential field in which actions are demanded that contradict one's own perception and thus one's embodied identity. This can be experienced as a compulsion to act permanently against one's own structure. In existing research, this has often been described as an "exaggerated" sense of justice. In fact, it may point to a deeper necessity for structural coherence, one that is not primarily moral but functionally grounded.

Work makes no sense for the author if it is not, in its immediate concreteness, what it claims to be. The author cannot separate work, world, and identity. Postponing, bracketing out, or suppressing individual components is not possible. This is not a matter of free decision, but a condition that unfolds within the body itself. Deviations lead to dysfunction, manifesting as a withdrawal of energy, intelligence, and coordination. Coherence thus becomes the fundamental condition of work, one that cannot be arbitrarily abstracted.

The present contribution takes as its starting point this limit case, in which implicit assumptions about work become visible. This case not only allows for a deeper understanding of certain neurodivergent forms of work, but also points to the concept of work itself. What becomes visible here in extreme form affects many people in attenuated ways and can be observed, for example, in phenomena such as burnout, stress, or loss of meaning. A more precise analysis of this dynamic can therefore extend beyond the individual case and reveal fundamental aspects of work.

In the profile described here, work capacity is strictly coupled to a form of eigenzeit-based binding. Action, perception, and meaning arise only within a self-organized temporal context. If this context is interrupted by external demands, fragmented processes, or normative causal structures, the result is not merely a decrease in performance, but a collapse of the capacity to act. This state can be masked for short periods, but proves unstable in the long term.

The aim of this contribution is to conceptually grasp this relationship and to clarify its consequences for the understanding of work. It is argued that the common distinction between “functioning” and “non-functioning” subjects is insufficient. Instead, the question must be asked under which conditions work is possible at all.

Whereas previous works have developed Eigenzeit ontologically as well as in the context of neurodivergence and poverty, the present contribution focuses on the structural conditions of work capacity itself.

2. Eigenzeit-Based Binding

Eigenzeit-based binding designates a form of world-relation in which work capacity is bound to a coherent, self-organized temporal context. Within this context, perception, action, and world-relation are not separate processes, but arise synchronously and are mutually conditioned.

In this model, work is not the execution of predefined functions, but an event of world-building. It does not unfold continuously, but in phase-like, non-linear processes characterized by sudden condensations and transformations. These processes are tied to specific energetic and cognitive states in which coherence is not presupposed, but is produced in each instance.

If this context is disrupted, for example through external instructions, temporal constraints, or structural inconsistencies, a desynchronization of the involved processes occurs. This manifests as loss of energy, cognitive breakdown, and blockage of action. Crucially, these effects are not to be understood as secondary reactions, but as the immediate consequence of a rupture in eigenzeit-based binding.

3. Externally Imposed Causality and Structural Incompatibility

Modern work and social systems operate on the basis of externally imposed causality. They abstract work, effect, profit, and utility. Actions are evaluated within predefined nexuses of effect in which purposes, means, and outcomes are already defined. Subjects are integrated into these nexuses and assessed according to their ability to function within these structures.

For eigenzeit-bound individuals, a fundamental conflict emerges here. The external imposition of causality overlays the individual's own nexus of action and meaning. This does not only affect the concrete activity, but undermines the condition of its possibility.

This can be assessed not only in relation to work itself, but also in relation to the surrounding causal structures, for example in labor law or in welfare-state governance logics. This can be exemplified by the German construction of the *Bedarfsgemeinschaft*. It establishes a collective nexus of attribution in which individual actions are situated within an externally defined system of need and obligation. Individuals in a shared household are made responsible for one another, thereby shifting state costs into social proximity relations.

For eigenzeit-bound forms of work, this results in a systematic delegitimation, as actions appear within a framework of evaluation that does not correspond to their internal structure. Actions appear erroneous in this context not because they are so within their own nexus, but because they do not fit into the predefined causal framework. They follow an order of their own that cannot become compatible under these conditions. This failure is not an expression of lack of will, but the result of a structural incompatibility between eigenzeit-based binding and functional work regimes, which systematically misinterpret and exclude these forms of work. As a consequence, the material and structural conditions required for the continuation of eigenzeit-bound work are withdrawn.

The result is not adaptation, but blockage. The superimposition of incompatible temporal and causal structures leads to a loss of possibilities for action that cannot be overcome either through motivation or through coercion.

From this perspective, it becomes visible that certain institutional practices do not merely operate in a regulatory manner, but intervene in the conditions of work capacity themselves. They treat work as independent of the body and its temporal organization and presuppose that it is arbitrarily disposable. For eigenzeit-bound forms of world-relation, this constitutes a structural intervention that can be associated with increased strain (health-related harm) and long-term dysfunctional consequences.

4. Consequences for the Concept of Work

The analysis of eigenzeit-based binding suggests that work capacity cannot be presupposed as a universal property. Rather, it is bound to specific conditions of coherence. Work regimes based on fragmentation, external control, and normative causality systematically exclude certain forms of world-relation.

This exclusion typically appears as individual failure. In fact, however, it constitutes a structural incompatibility between different forms of temporality and world-relation. From this follows the necessity to rethink work: not as functional execution within given structures, but as an eigenzeit-bound practice of world-building.

This is something the author has further developed in his book *Radical Worker: The Fight for Self-Determined Work*.

At this point, it becomes evident that the classical model of work in industrial and service-based societies is not without structural tensions. Precisely the absence of modes of working, such as those visible in eigenzeit-bound forms, makes these tensions recognizable and describable.

Certain neurodivergent constellations, in this context, not only contribute to the generation of innovation, but also to the visibility of inconsistencies, false assumptions, and problematic power structures. Their mode of working thus points to a critical function within existing systems that goes beyond mere productivity.

Against this background, a rethinking appears necessary not only in view of the burdensome consequences of classical forms of work. Rather, the analysis suggests that different forms of work capacity coexist that cannot easily be subsumed under uniform models. A future-oriented order of work would therefore have to create conditions under which eigenzeit-bound forms of work can remain possible, instead of systematically suppressing or misinterpreting them.

Work is not possible under all conditions. For eigenzeit-bound forms of world-relation, it arises only where time, action, and meaning can be coherently coupled.

The perspective developed here stands in loose relation to approaches that understand cognition and action as embodied, temporally structured processes, for example in the context of enactive theories (cf. Francisco Varela) or philosophical concepts of lived time (cf. Henri Bergson). There are also points of contact with approaches within autism research that emphasize the role of focused attention and context-dependent processing (cf. Dinah Murray).

The present contribution goes beyond these approaches by determining the structural coupling of time, action, and meaning not only as a condition of cognition, but as a condition of work capacity itself, and by analyzing its incompatibility with functional work regimes and institutional causal structures.

Within existing autism research, numerous phenomena are described that point to particularities in sensory processing, social interaction, or executive organization. These descriptions, however, often remain at the level of individual symptoms or isolated problem constellations. Accordingly, institutional responses tend to focus on punctual adaptations within existing work structures, for example through the reduction of stimuli or organizational modifications. The perspective developed here suggests that such measures may address individual burdens, but can fail to grasp the underlying relation. In this light, the observed phenomena do not appear as marginal problems, but as indications of a deeper structural incompatibility. The analysis thus shifts from the question of appropriate adaptation to the question of the conditions under which work capacity can arise at all.

The phenomena described here are not deviations within existing models of work, but point to their structural limits.

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Thinking in Formation: On a Form of Cognition That Produces Knowledge in Process

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Abstract

The present paper examines a case of cognition that developed over a period of more than three decades outside academic practices and nevertheless consistently produces knowledge. The point of departure is the observation that this knowledge is not primarily organized in propositional form, that is, not as a set of statements that can be linearly derived and verified, but instead emerges as structure in enactment. Meaning does not stabilize locally within the sentence, but across sequences, through *setzung* (a *non-derived operative placement*), displacement, and condensation.

Through analyses of texts and biographical sequences, it is shown that in this case an operative invariance can be identified that remains stable across different contexts. This invariance points toward a form of cognition that cannot be sufficiently explained through psychological conditioning, deficit models, or existing descriptions of neurodivergence. Instead, a different organization of cognition becomes visible, in which knowledge is not secured prior to the process, but stabilizes only within the process itself.

To further specify these observations, concepts from topology and morphogenesis are introduced. Within this framework, knowledge appears as form that preserves itself under variation, rather than as static information. Truth shifts from the statement toward the structure that proves itself over time. *Eigenzeit* is understood here as a constitutive condition of cognition: knowledge is bound to irreversible processes and cannot be fully separated from its enactment without losing its structure.

The analysis leads to a shift in fundamental epistemic assumptions. Concepts such as objectivity, reproducibility, and proof are not rejected, but understood as bound to specific cognitive modes. The paper argues that within the same scientific space, different protocols of cognition may exist that are not fully translatable into one another. The examined case does not provide proof for a general theory, but makes visible that forms of cognition exist which can only be insufficiently described through existing concepts.

This has not only theoretical significance, but directly concerns the evaluation of work, research, and cognitive capability within existing institutions.

Note on Translation and Form

Since the present investigation concerns cognition as process and structural movement, the translation itself becomes part of the material. German permits greater syntactic rupture, condensation, and abrupt shifts of level, while English tends toward rhythmic smoothing and conceptual clarification. As a result, certain sequences in the English version may appear more coherent and philosophically stabilized than in the German original. This difference is not merely linguistic, but directly relevant to the epistemic structure examined in the text.

Methodological Note

The present analysis is not based on an externally collected dataset, but on the systematic evaluation of a body of work developed over more than three decades, supplemented by biographical sequences. Validation does not occur through reproduction of identical results, but through the identification of recurring operative structures that remain stable under variation.

Keywords: non-linear cognition, process-based cognition, neurodivergent epistemology, Eigenzeit, embodied cognition, process philosophy, epistemic pluralism, knowledge production, structural invariance, topological cognition, morphogenesis, form-based knowledge, relational cognition, operatoric cognition, world-binding, enactive cognition, retrospective stabilization, cognitive architecture, epistemology of process, knowledge as formation, structural coherence, emergent cognition, monotropism, veridical mapping, autistic cognition, ADHD and cognition, cognitive incompatibility, institutional cognition, epistemic structures, irreversible processes, lived knowledge, embodied knowledge, pattern recognition, recursive stabilization, cognitive world-building, operational epistemology, structure and variation, triangulation of meaning, processual rationality, self-organizing cognition, cognitive systems, simulation critique, ontology of knowledge, dynamic cognition, relational intelligence, form and knowledge, epistemic conflict, structural cognition, neurodiversity theory, cognitive pluralism, meaning formation, knowledge and embodiment, operatoric epistemology

1. Point of Departure: A Rupture

If one were to let several people without academic training conduct research over decades, very different methods and forms of knowledge would likely emerge. The intuitive assumption would be that these differences would gradually converge over time, that through trial and error those procedures would prevail which we today describe as scientific. Yet it is precisely this assumption that is put into question here.

The question is not whether people eventually learn to conduct research “correctly,” but whether what we define as correct is itself already the result of a specific cognitive organization. Put differently: Does cognition inevitably lead toward classical science – or does a particular form of cognition lead to what we today call science?

This is explicitly not about cultural difference, not about indigenous forms of knowledge or esoteric counter-models. The rupture lies closer. It runs through the same language space, the same concepts, the same questions. It could affect different students within the same university and at first they might not even notice it.

At the center stands a case that does not merely claim this difference, but embodies it. The author is neurodivergent and has, over more than three decades, developed a self-contained body of work largely isolated from academic practices. This work produces results, shows structural consistency, develops concepts, operates across different domains – and does so simultaneously in a way that, under classical scientific criteria, would be read as insufficient or false. Lacking academic training, the author effectively attempted to reinvent the wheel independently multiple times and, from an academic perspective, repeatedly did so “incorrectly.” Over thirty years, he barely improved his mode of cognition. Instead, it remained essentially the same, as if innate, and nevertheless produced results through paradoxical behavior that are structurally comparable to classical results.

What appears here is not an “anything goes” in the sense of Feyerabend. It is not the dissolution of method, but the emergence of another form of method. A cognition that is not less structured, but differently structured. Not less logical, but following another logic. And precisely because of this, it fails according to existing standards – not because it is inferior to them, but because it was not made for them. One could subsume all this under neurodivergence or autism, but upon closer examination these frameworks are no longer sufficient. Not because they are wrong, but because they can no longer render the whole picture describable, which raises new questions regarding their definition.

What becomes visible in this case is not the existence of two separate sciences, but the operation of different protocols of cognition within the same scientific space. These protocols do not differ primarily in content, but in the way knowledge emerges, is organized, and becomes stabilized.

In this case, rationality is for example bound to high emotionalization rather than to distance. The validity of cognition is bound to high relational density rather than to external measurability, to name only two fundamental differences.

The classical scientific protocol is based on objectivity. It separates observer and object, isolates statements, develops them through comprehensible steps, grounds them, references them, tests them. It stabilizes knowledge by detaching it from context. Truth then appears as a property of statements that remain verifiable independently of the conditions of their emergence.

In the author's case, however, knowledge does not primarily emerge after enactment, but within enactment. It is bound to action, to *Eigenzeit*, to concrete situations. Statements are not closed units, but condensations within an ongoing process. Stability does not emerge through abstraction, but through the ability of a structure to maintain itself under change.

At first glance this would appear as personal, arbitrary style, or as lack of qualification, if it were not logical, goal-directed, and successful in the sense of research over decades.

One protocol produces clarity through reduction.

The other produces clarity through condensation.

One stabilizes through distance.

The other stabilizes through relation.

Both are rational. Both function.

But they do not speak the same language.

To correctly understand the following investigation, it is essential to recognize the sequence. First, over thirty years, a body of work emerged in art and research that contains thousands of pages, eleven printed books, around ninety papers, and one feature film. Only on the basis of the question of how and why this work emerged did it become necessary to examine how the author processes knowledge. And only at this point did it become possible to do so without excessive interpretation or speculation, because the available material had for the first time reached a massive threshold. Until a few years ago, the author did not know that he was neurodivergent, which allows the work to provide a relatively unfiltered view of the patterns. This applies especially to the German versions, which were only lightly edited or were not reshaped through translation and revision. This is particularly true for his printed books in German. Many later papers function as interfaces into his thinking and, like the present text, are more strongly edited, essentially in order to avoid ongoing discrimination resulting from the difference of expression.

It must also be stated clearly here that the author is not attempting to postulate a new model, nor to claim exceptional status, but merely to make patterns and deviations transparent so that the resulting questions can be further investigated and deepened in research.

The present case does not function as a representative example, but as a fully developed instance of a possible cognitive structure.

2. Traces of Another Cognition

The difference examined here cannot be sufficiently described as the result of psychological conditioning. Conditioning concerns contents, evaluations, and behavioral patterns that change over the course of experience and adapt to contexts. Cognition, by contrast, refers to the manner in which perception, processing, and the stabilization of

knowledge are organized in the first place. While conditioning varies, cognitive organization remains relatively stable in its fundamental operations across different contexts. The patterns observed in the present case display such a structural invariance and therefore cannot be derived solely from biographical or psychological factors, but instead point toward another form of the organization of cognition.

For this reason, we should first examine a text by the author that was not edited, does not function as an interface text for neurotypicals, and displays a characteristic underlying pattern. This pattern is perceived differently by different readers depending on their own cognition, recognized either as disturbance or understood as meaningful in itself. What may at first glance appear strange to some readers and contrary to academic norms reveals, upon closer examination, a highly complex structure of intelligence following its own logic, a logic that produces, validates, condenses, and tests knowledge, but in a completely different manner than classical science. The author first presents the original German text (in the English version both versions are shown) and then breaks the text down into individual blocks in order to make the pattern recognizable, a pattern that appears not only in this text, but fractally throughout the author's entire body of work and life.

From the book *They Cannot Understand*, German print edition, pp. 15–16, english version below:

“Wird etwas definiert, dann verschwindet dessen Potenzial. Es wird begrenzt. Das Feste bildet einen Zerrfilter: Habitate, Welten, Realitäten, in denen was als fest definiert ist, alle anderen Anteile in Beziehung dazu verschiebt, weil die Begrenzung des einen Potenzials stets auch die Potenziale aller anderen Verbindungen verengt. Die Vorstellung eines unabhängigen, freien Raumes ist eine Illusion. Das bedeutet, so führe ich es in Die Physik der Armen umfassend aus, dass eine jede Existenz, mit Zunahme ihrer Verdichtung eine Verzerrung aller anderen Existenzen bedeutet, und je dominanter die eine Verfestigung, desto stärker werden die Ränder verschoben. Weil wir eine Einheit sind, die sich nur dehnt, aber nicht in sich zu unabhängigen Objekten abreißt. Zunächst nur eine These, die wir im Laufe des Buches noch vertiefen werden. Die Verengung drückt nicht nur andere hinaus, sie staut Energie, bis sich das ganze Gefüge verschiebt. Das Phänomen lässt sich – ich habe es in meinem Buch Die Physik der Armen sehr vertieft ausgeführt – als Seinsverschiebung beschreiben. Damit meine ich, dass Unterdrückung mehr ist als Gewalt eines Objektes gegen das andere, sondern eben auch Verformung des Selbst. Es ist ein relationaler Prozess. Der Formende ist von der Verformung nicht getrennt, isoliert, sondern ist Teil davon. Weil der Unterdrücker Teil desselben Körpers ist, den er zu beherrschen glaubt, steht er nicht außerhalb der Beziehung. Er presst nicht einfach auf einen fremden Körper, sondern auf die eigene Struktur, die er damit verzerrt. Unterdrückung ist keine einseitige Bewegung, sondern ein Rückkopplungsprozess, der Täter und Opfer im selben Feld bindet. Wer den

Fremden fortschiebt, der zerrt zugleich an sich selbst. Die Gewalt kehrt als Deformation zurück. Weil das Potenzial, welches man dadurch verhindert, dem gesamten Raum die Komplexität und Vielfalt nimmt. Gewalt verengt uns alle, weil Verfestigung Potenzial entgegenwirkt. Das verändert nicht nur den Einzelnen, sondern die Gestalt des Ganzen. Der Prozess der Existenz selbst wird so zu einem Phänomen der Dynamik – ohne feste Verortung, ohne objektbezogene Qualität. Das ist zentral zu verstehen. Wenn das Sein eine Verfestigung ist, als Prozess, dann ist sie zugleich ein Schwinden, ein Verlust an Raum und Dimension. Somit wird Existenz zur Implikation einer Abwesenheit, und diese führt zu einer prozessualen Antwort, in der die Differenz zwischen Objekt und Potenzial zum Raum des Seins selbst wird. Das Bewusstsein ist die Differenz, die Lücke, die sich als Raum stülpt. Diese Abwesenheit impliziert Existenz und folglich Erkenntnis als ein permanentes Danebenzielen – als das unaufhörliche Streben, sich selbst zu erreichen, ohne sich je ganz zu besitzen. Denn das absolute Ding, ist das Objekt minus allem anderen. Verliert das Ding auf diese Weise auch jede Beziehung zur Welt, wird es zu einem toten Nichts. Bewusstsein kann also weder Ding, noch alles, noch nichts sein, sondern das, was ist, wenn Potenzial und Objekt sich niemals stabilisieren können. Masken, die um Authentizität kämpfen, die in diesem Kampf nur immerzu neue Masken hervorbringen können. Jeder sucht sich selbst und verstellt durch die eigene Existenz jeder neuen Generation den unabhängigen, den unverzerrten Blick auf sich.”

English translation:

“Once something is defined, its potential disappears. It becomes limited. The fixed forms a distortion filter: habitats, worlds, realities in which what is defined as fixed shifts all other parts in relation to it, because the limitation of one potential always narrows the potentials of all other connections as well. The idea of an independent, free space is an illusion. This means, as I elaborate extensively in *The Physics of the Poor*, that every existence, with the increase of its condensation, produces a distortion of all other existences, and the more dominant one solidification becomes, the more strongly the edges are displaced. Because we are a unity that stretches, but does not rip apart into independent objects. For now only a thesis, which we will deepen further over the course of the book. Narrowing does not merely push others outward, it accumulates energy until the entire structure shifts. The phenomenon can – as I have explored in great depth in my book *The Physics of the Poor* – be described as a shift of being [Seinsverschiebung]. By this I mean that oppression is more than violence of one object against another, but also a deformation of the self. It is a relational process. The one who forms is not separated from the deformation, isolated from it, but part of it. Because the oppressor is part of the same body he believes himself to dominate, he does not stand outside the relation. He does not

simply press upon a foreign body, but upon his own structure, which he thereby distorts. Oppression is not a one-sided movement, but a feedback process that binds perpetrator and victim within the same field. Whoever pushes the stranger away simultaneously pulls at himself. Violence returns as deformation. Because the potential prevented in this way removes complexity and diversity from the entire space. Violence narrows all of us because solidification acts against potential. This changes not only the individual, but the form of the whole. The process of existence itself thus becomes a phenomenon of dynamics – without fixed location, without object-bound quality. This is central to understand. If being is a solidification, as process, then it is simultaneously a disappearance, a loss of space and dimension. Existence thus becomes the implication of an absence, and this absence leads to a processual response in which the difference between object and potential becomes the space of being itself. Consciousness is the difference, the gap, folding itself outward as space. This absence implies existence and consequently cognition as a permanent aiming beside [Danebenzielen] – as the unceasing attempt to reach oneself without ever fully possessing oneself. Because the absolute thing is the object minus everything else. If the thing in this way loses every relation to the world, it becomes a dead nothing. Consciousness therefore can be neither thing, nor everything, nor nothing, but that which is, when potential and object can never stabilize themselves completely. Masks struggling for authenticity, which in this struggle can only continuously produce new masks. Everyone searches for themselves and through their own existence obstructs for every new generation the independent, the undistorted gaze upon itself.”

We will now break the text apart in order to make the pattern visible. At first, this is not about proof, but about the question of whether a pattern is present here, or whether this is merely interpretation. Over the course of the investigation we will encounter further examples of this kind, all based on the author’s thirty-year body of work.

“Once something is defined, its potential disappears. It becomes limited.”

The author begins with a strong, non-derived *setzung*. No concept of “definition” is developed; instead, a displacement is immediately enacted. One can see here that the text does not explain, but irritates a framework. The statement stands in isolation and at first appears exaggerated, yet precisely through this it generates movement. It is not a definition, but a destabilization of the expected. Such *setzungen* (a non-derived operative placement) are typical throughout the entire body of work. One must keep in mind that the author did not learn and expand his knowledge through literature or academic education, but through another mechanism of aligning patterns within real space. He places one tone, places another tone beside it, and triangulates statements. At first this sounds unusual, but throughout the entire work it repeatedly condenses along a similar pattern.

“The fixed acts as a distortion filter: habitats, worlds, realities in which what is defined as fixed shifts all other parts in relation to it, because the limitation of one potential always narrows the potentials of all other connections as well.”

Instead of clarifying the first *setzung*, the author expands the field. One can see here how the concept is not made more precise, but relationally charged. “Distortion filter” is not a defined term, but a functional nodal point that unfolds meaning only through interplay. The text moves away from linear explanation toward a network of relations. It is, in a sense, the net in which knowledge becomes entangled and reorganized.

“The idea of an independent, free space is an illusion.”

Here a rupture occurs. The author changes the level without transition or derivation. One can see that the movement does not proceed along an argument, but along condensations. For a classical reader this appears like a jump, yet in fact the previous structure is lifted onto a broader ontological level. Something has been recognized and is now being grouped.

“This means, as I elaborate extensively in *The Physics of the Poor*, that every existence, with the increase of its condensation, produces a distortion of all other existences, and the more dominant one solidification becomes, the more strongly the edges are displaced.”

Here a first condensation begins. The author brings together several earlier *setzungen* without explicitly connecting them. One can see that meaning does not emerge locally, but through reference back to previously introduced tensions. The reference to another work is not evidence in the classical sense, but part of an internal structural networking.

“Because we are a unity that stretches, but does not rip apart into independent objects. For now only a thesis, which we will deepen further over the course of the book.”

The first sentence continues and radicalizes the condensation. The following insertion (“At first only a thesis...”) functions like a classical marker, but briefly interrupts the author’s own mode. One can see here a tension between processual writing and a later attempt to translate it into academic readability. The author briefly falls out of the flow, reorders, and checks himself.

“Narrowing does not merely push others outward, it accumulates energy until the entire structure shifts. The phenomenon can – as I have explored in great depth in my book *The Physics of the Poor* – be described as a shift of being [Seinsverschiebung].”

The author introduces a concept without defining it. “Seinsverschiebung” does not emerge through delimitation, but through application within the field. One can see that concepts here are not explained, but set and stabilized through repeated use. Similar to a

Rubik's Cube, order is calibrated here through the shifting of sentence parts, meanings, and tensions.

"By this I mean that oppression is more than violence of one object against another, but also a deformation of the self. It is a relational process. The forming one is not separated from the deformation, isolated from it, but part of it."

Here the previously introduced concept is further unfolded, yet not through formal definition, but through displacement of perspective. The author describes not a property, but a structure of relations. Meaning emerges through the rearrangement of directions of view. A kind of triangulation takes place. Sentences, words, and tensions are not only used like conventional language, but simultaneously like a topology.

"Because the oppressor is part of the same body he believes himself to dominate, he does not stand outside the relation. He does not simply press upon a foreign body, but upon his own structure, which he thereby distorts."

One can see here an increasing condensation. The statements interlock without a linear argument being constructed. The text intensifies the previously established relation and continues it through variation.

"Oppression is not a one-sided movement, but a feedback process that binds perpetrator and victim within the same field. Whoever pushes the stranger away simultaneously pulls at himself. Violence returns as deformation."

The movement continues without closure. One recognizes that the author is not writing toward a result, but stabilizing the structure through repeated reformulations. Meaning emerges through repetition under variation.

"Because the potential prevented in this way removes complexity and diversity from the entire space. Violence narrows all of us because solidification acts against potential."

Here an earlier *setzung* is once again taken up and continued. One can see that the text works circularly without repeating itself. Every recurrence slightly alters the context and generates additional depth.

"This changes not only the individual, but the form of the whole. The process of existence itself thus becomes a phenomenon of dynamics – without fixed location, without object-bound quality. This is central to understand."

The author once again shifts the level, from concrete examples toward a general structure. "This is central to understand" functions like an attempt at fixation, yet remains embedded within the process.

"If being is a solidification, as process, then it is simultaneously a disappearance, a loss of space and dimension. Existence thus becomes the implication of an absence, and this absence leads to a processual response in which the difference between object and potential becomes the space of being itself."

Here the text reaches a high degree of condensation. Several concepts overlap without being individually defined. One can clearly see that meaning emerges only through interplay and does not arise from isolated statements.

“Consciousness is the difference, the gap, folding itself outward as space. This absence implies existence and consequently cognition as a permanent aiming beside [Danebenzielen] – as the unceasing attempt to reach oneself without ever fully possessing oneself.”

Here the author explicitly formulates his own mode of cognition. “Danebenzielen” is not a metaphor, but a description of the movement previously enacted. One can see that at this point the text reflects its own structure without stepping outside it.

“Because the absolute thing is the object minus everything else. If the thing in this way loses every relation to the world, it becomes a dead nothing. Consciousness therefore can be neither thing, nor everything, nor nothing, but that which is, when potential and object can never stabilize themselves completely.”

The argument is not concluded, but further opened. The author avoids final fixation and keeps the structure movable. Meaning remains within the process. He does this because his thinking produces specific knowledge only within the respective moment itself. If he attempts to think it beforehand, he can no longer write it down afterward, because for him the logic collapses. He must begin a new cycle that recalibrates the knowledge once more, slightly displaced. But he cannot simply fix knowledge and then describe it. If he attempts this, he immediately falls back into a new process that carries the knowledge further. Knowledge, energy, and rationality therefore always coincide with movement, emotion, and concrete momentum and never occur isolated from them. For this reason his research never ends, because if it were finished, life itself would in a sense stop. As soon as he moves within space, he generates knowledge. Knowledge, world, identity, and form are movement.

“Masks struggling for authenticity, which in this struggle can only continuously produce new masks. Everyone searches for themselves and through their own existence obstructs for every new generation the independent, the undistorted gaze upon itself.”

The text does not end with a result, but with another variation of the pattern. One can see that the movement continues without arriving at a final point. The structure remains open and generates further possibilities of connection. In this way, knowledge is cyclically condensed and topologically tested through *setzung* and deviation.

What overall becomes visible here:

- *Setzungen* occur without prior definition
- Meaning does not emerge locally, but across sequences

- Ruptures are not errors, but transitions between levels
- Concepts stabilize themselves through recurrence and variation
- Cognition is not presented, but generated within the text itself

The author's partner agrees that in conversations he often requires a kind of run-up phase in which he says things one academically wants to correct, but if he is not interrupted, increasingly clearer, sharper, and more coherent statements follow that suddenly appear, often surprisingly, yet are not built linearly. The pattern does not always apply, but often. There are variations depending on the difference of the entry point within space, time, and context. Earlier, she confused this with mansplaining. Today she understands the necessity of the widening movement. The author must repeatedly recalibrate space, moment, and context.

Earlier, the author stuttered; even today he often speaks too quickly, too much in ruptures.

The pattern observable in the text, or in language, is not only found there, but also in the structure of the life trajectory itself. There too the same sequence appears: *setzung*, deviation, friction, loss of function under external control, renewed self-movement, condensation. What follows is not a complete biography, but exemplary sequences. Their value lies not in the individual event, but in the recurrence of the same structure under changing conditions.

At school the author had a gym teacher who demanded exercises through military drill. The other children participated. The author quite literally stepped out of line. Not as planned provocation, but because external control was immediately experienced as loss of coordination, energy, and capacity for action. The more strongly an action was externally defined, the more abilities disintegrated that in self-determined contexts were clearly present. What becomes visible is not lack of intelligence or will, but a structural coupling of ability to self-movement.

This pattern repeated itself later in very different work contexts. In his twenties, for example, the author worked for roughly three quarters of a year as a hospital photographer at the AKH Vienna. This job functioned comparatively long. Not because it was especially easy, but because it combined high self-movement with low immediate external control. The author moved largely alone through the university clinic, photographed medical curiosities, encountered operating rooms, autopsies, boundary experiences. The work framework was institutional, but the cognitive process remained autonomous. The job was not merely executed, but used as a space of perception and research.

Things were different in a short-term job at a sausage stand in Vienna. There the task was tightly predefined, physically automated, immediately functional. Within only a few days coordination visibly collapsed. The author made mistakes far below his usual abilities, mixed up orders, served undercooked meat. The same person, another

structure: where autonomous movement was possible, work functioned; where action became externally defined routine, function disintegrated.

A similar pattern appeared in freelance work as an illustrator. The activity functioned as long as the author could work self-determinedly. As soon as customer expectations forced the work into an external form of expectation, blockage emerged. Again, the central phenomenon was not lack of ability, but the rupture between capability and functional usability.

In 2010 the author threatened (art action) to kill a bull in front of Red Bull headquarters in order to make visible the relation between human beings, economy, symbol, and violence. He thus began directly using his cognition within the field of art and research. His radical *setzung* mapped economic structure through intensification in movement. Once again, cognition emerged not through distanced observation, but through confrontation, risk, and friction. Through manipulation of space.

Public appearances also display the same logic. The author was repeatedly invited as a speaker because he initially appeared competent, original, and interesting. Yet as soon as predictable communication was expected, the situation collapsed. He entered the stage, saw the audience, and the prepared knowledge lost its form. Instead of reproducing a lecture, a new cognitive process began within the moment itself. Resonance, irritation, audience, space, and expectation became part of the thinking. For the audience this usually became overwhelming. For the author it was not a failure of thinking, but its renewed beginning under altered conditions.

At the same time, his interventions increasingly mirrored real systemic conflict fields and made deeper structural problems within systems visible. In this way it increasingly became an act of research.

The same pattern can also be seen in an encounter with an editor from Fischer Verlag and the author Silvia Bovenschen. For a period of time, the novel *Stieren des Weltdesigners* came close to possible publication. The expectation was that the author should decide more clearly: novel or theory, literature or concept, narrative or reflection. But for him the novel was not a literary commodity, but a research probe. It was not meant to conclude a product, but to open a movement together with society. The bridge existed, but it demanded a form of translation that would have damaged the process itself.

Another example from school years shows the same displacement on a microscopic level. An art teacher asked the students to explain a work of art shown through a slide projector. The slides were old, visibly aged, covered with dust. The other students described what the teacher expected: the image, the artist, the presumed meaning. The author described the dust on the slide. Again, the difference lies not in defiance or inability, but in another prioritization of reality. What is read is not the expected object, but the actual condition of appearance.

Over decades the same sequence thus repeats itself: *setzung*, perception, displacement, reaction, renewed *setzung*, testing through deviation, condensation in real contact. Stability did not emerge through adaptation to predefined forms, but only where sufficient openness remained to hold world, thinking, body, and identity within the same process. Precisely here embodied cognition becomes visible: not as possession, but as an ongoing binding of experience, action, and form.

This repeatedly led to friction in jobs, with institutions, corporations, and authorities. The author could not adapt himself to imposed structures because imposed structures destroyed his mode of existence. This concerned not only thinking, but also emotions and the fundamental functionality of body and mind within space.

The case is extreme, though naturally it also contains exceptions within the structure. It is, after all, an organic principle. Not every *setzung* stabilized itself; most collapsed over the course of the process and were not carried further. It also remains entirely open whether this structure is individually bound, a singular case, or whether it appears in modified form in other cognitive modes as well.

Footnote

This form of analysis presupposes that cognition is not accessible exclusively through its explicit contents, but can also be approached through recurring patterns of its organization.

The present approach therefore does not understand itself as a description of individual peculiarities, but as a reconstruction of an operative structure manifesting itself across different forms of expression.

In this sense, the individual case is not to be read as an exception, but as a fully developed instance of a possible pattern.

3. The Minimal Operation of This Cognition

What was described in the previous sections as a pattern in text and biography can be traced back to a recurring, elementary structure. This structure is not a method in the classical sense, not a consciously applied procedure, but an operative unit underlying the thinking itself and reproducing independently of content, context, or intention.

This unit can be described through a sequence that repeatedly appears in varying forms:

***Setzung* – displacement – condensation – retrospective stabilization**

These concepts do not designate steps in the sense of a plan, but phases of a process that exists only in enactment.

3.1. *Setzung*

The process does not begin with a definition, a question, or a hypothesis, but with a *setzung*.

This *setzung* is not justified. But neither is it arbitrary. It emerges from an implicit condensation preceding language. What is set is not the result of a thought, but an access to something not yet fully explicated. Yet it often begins as a difference that is perceived and contrasted through the *setzung*.

What is decisive here is that the *setzung* does not “hit.”

It is usually slightly beside the point. Most often emotionally exaggerated, energetically somewhat overdosed.

Precisely this slight displacement from a possible exact naming generates movement. If the *setzung* were formulated directly and unambiguously, the process would come to a standstill. The structure would be transferred into a fixed form and thereby blocked in its further unfolding. This would not be compatible with the present cognition. The cognition requires movement within space and *Eigenzeitlichkeit*. It must repeatedly begin anew with an answer. As a rule it does not draw upon previous knowledge, because within the local momentum this immediately appears unsuitable. As lie. This explains why the author never comes to rest within a norm.

The *setzung* therefore does not generate clarity, but a field of tension.

The validation is not beforehand, but structurally across time.

3.2. Displacement

The *setzung* is not followed by linear elaboration, but by displacement.

This displacement can appear as rupture: shifts of perspective, jumps between levels, new concepts, seemingly unconnected statements. Within classical understanding this appears as inconsistency or lack of stringency.

In fact, the displacement is functionally necessary.

It prevents the premature fixation of the first *setzung* and forces the structure to show itself again under altered conditions. Meaning emerges here not through the precision of a single point, but through the opening of a field in which different *setzungen* enter into relation with one another.

The displacement is therefore not an error within the argument, but the condition under which an argument can emerge at all.

If the *setzung* opens a dimensional axis, then the displacement opens the next dimension. Dualities are replaced through three-point systems, through triangulations that are

substantially more unstable, thereby preserving movement and allowing patterns to be perspectivally scanned while continuously generating new movement-energy.

3.3. Condensation

Only through repeated *setzung* and displacement does a structure begin to condense.

This condensation is not the result of linear derivation, but of recursive movement. Earlier *setzungen* are taken up again, passed through within altered contexts, positioned against one another, and overlapped.

In this way a form of coherence emerges that does not lie within the individual sentence, but within the relation between sequences. It is therefore a communication in which the spaces between sentences carry a weighting similar to the contents of the sentences themselves.

In this context, condensation means:

A structure begins to stabilize itself in such a way that under variation it does not collapse arbitrarily, but preserves itself topologically. *Eigenzeit* here means a temporality in which space and momentum first make the structure readable, like a lens moved closely across a text. Within the focal point, knowledge unfolds that becomes visible only within the respective *Eigenzeit*. It does not continue as fact, as object, but as displacement within space, thereby requiring the next *setzung*.

Contradictions play a central role in this. They are not eliminated, but function as indicators showing where the structure is not yet sufficiently formed. At these points the process begins again, displacing, varying, intensifying.

The emerging form is not planned. It is the result of movement. It is consequence of *Eigenzeit*. Context therefore becomes just as important for intelligibility as content itself. In a certain sense, no contents are aimed at that would remain stable independently of context.

3.4. Retrospective Stabilization

Within this mode, stability does not emerge before or during the *setzung*, but afterward. One could say that knowledge is transmitted through history, not through argumentative proof. As history, this knowledge is simultaneously not a limitation upon the present.

A statement is not considered valid because it was logically cleanly derived or immediately convincing, but because it proves itself sustainable in the further course of the process. Sustainability becomes visible in the fact that the underlying structure remains preserved under different conditions.

This means:

Knowledge here is retrospective.

Only in retrospect does it become visible that a series of *setzungen* and displacements was not accidental, but part of a consistent process of form-generation. Before that, no certainty exists.

This form of stabilization differs fundamentally from classical procedures of validation. It is not based on the repeatability of identical steps, but on the recurrence of structure under variation. The author does not compare contents or actions, but reads and translates patterns of form. The question we will later still have to clarify is why the author repeatedly generates knowledge from this one operation across different thematic fields, processes, contents, and situations, and whether this knowledge encounters limits and why he is able to generate knowledge from form at all. And what kind of knowledge this actually is.

4. Consequence: Knowledge as Operation, Not as Object

From this minimal unit follows a fundamental shift in the understanding of knowledge.

Within this mode, knowledge is not an object that is recognized, stored, and reproduced. Nor is it a state that can be reached and then stably maintained.

Knowledge is an operation.

It exists only in the enactment of this sequence: *setzung*, displacement, condensation, stabilization. If the process is interrupted or transferred into a fixed form, the knowledge loses its functionality and must be generated again in the next moment.

This explains both the strength and the limit of this mode.

Its strength lies in the ability to grasp complex, non-linear structures without reducing them prematurely. Its limit lies in the difficulty of fixing results into stable, transferable form without damaging the underlying process.

The author's body of work therefore consists predominantly of innovations and insights resulting from the operatoric treatment of systems. He makes contradictions within systems visible. What he and his research do not do, or do less, is establish new models and rules that place themselves above complexity and strive toward universality. The knowledge always remains bound to processes emerging from local investigations in which he is directly involved, personally implicated. He must live through the patterns, must make them personal, emotional, subjective, in order to gain access to the internal differences that he then traverses within the operator.

It is therefore cognition, not style or deficit, because it concerns his entire existence and cannot be changed. It does not result from a traumatic event, but unfolds as a logical epistemic structure in the attempt to understand the world.

What becomes visible here is thus a cognition operating almost entirely opposite to that which grounds modern scientificity, yet nevertheless enabling forms of systems research that distanced observation and quantitative research cannot produce, because they do not generate *Eigenzeit*. Distanced observation is always limited in its capacity to know. It requires a form of securing and stabilization that simultaneously cuts it off from temporal immediacy, through which exceptions to the rule are not rarely overlooked or must laboriously be reintegrated again and again. It does not generate the binding necessary to disclose these particular forms of knowledge that are strongly bound to *Eigenzeit*. It has no access to this topology, but must reconstruct knowledge externally and repeatedly verify whether the observation is not subjectively distorted, because it requires distance in order to validate knowledge. The validation takes place outside the object of investigation. In the author's case, by contrast, predominantly within it.

Concepts such as topology are not used here in a strict disciplinary sense, but as heuristic models for the description of structural invariance.

4.1. Minimal Formula

In its strongest condensation, this cognition can therefore not be described through contents, themes, or methods, but only through its operative structure:

A setzung that does not hit generates movement.

Movement generates relation.

Relation generates form.

Form stabilizes itself retrospectively as knowledge.

The clearest indication that cognition is taking place here is the author's collapse whenever he is confronted with other conventions. The immediate loss of abilities, as though one had disconnected a device from electricity.

This incompatibility is not a normative glorification of dysfunction, but describes a structural non-fit between cognitive mode and institutional requirements.

5. Retrospective Cognition as a Form of Validation

One of the central irritations of this cognitive mode lies in the question of where knowledge comes from if it does not exist prior to formulation as a clear thought. Classically, one would expect that a statement emerges from already existing knowledge, that something is recognized, examined, and then transferred into language. In the case

described here, this order reverses itself. The statement is not the expression of already secured knowledge, but part of a process in which knowledge first comes into being at all.

Knowledge stabilizes itself, if at all, only as historical trace.

At the same time, this process is itself topologically predetermined. Calibration, condensation, and contrast always occur along similar structures until knowledge again becomes form and form again becomes knowledge. This is not knowledge understanding itself as separated, as independent, but as bound. Yet this calls subject and object into question once this knowledge simultaneously becomes scientific in the sense that it produces insights describing reality through this calibration and internal logic, generating data one would assume could not emerge in this way because they would be too distorted. But the system of this cognition has found another way of dealing with distortion — what in the other mode is called subjectivity. Not through distance, but through the alternation between self-rupture and relation-building.

This can be seen particularly clearly in the author's MNO theory described in *The Physics of the Poor*. The content is a direct expression of the cognition described here; form and content are organized in an almost isomorphic way. It is nevertheless a physical theory of consciousness connectable to classical theories, yet it did not emerge from distanced observation, literature analysis, or laboratory experiment, but from living through structural invariances. This process was highly emotional and largely carried out inwardly. The author derived the theory from his experience of poverty, not by interpreting its contents, but by reading its form. What is decisive here is not direct derivation in the sense of causal explanation, but structural homology: the patterns active within the experience of poverty — especially forms of gap, condensation, exclusion, and relational displacement — show a formal correspondence to structures also appearing in physical models. The theory therefore emerges not through transfer from content to content, but through the identification and elaboration of such homologies. In this way, from the form of poverty a form of physics becomes readable that is based not primarily on objects, but on relations, differences, and process structures.

This means that at the moment of the respective *setzung* no complete clarity is present. There is no thesis in the classical sense that is then worked through, but a form of implicit tension, a condensation not yet conceptually stabilized. Access to it occurs not through direct naming, but through movement: through writing, through displacement of perspectives, through friction with contexts and opposing positions. Only within this movement does a structure begin to emerge.

The question of how one then knows that something is “correct” cannot within this mode be answered through prior certainty. It shifts into the process itself. A statement shows its validity not because it is immediately convincing or logically complete, but because it does not dissolve under variation. When it is transferred into other contexts, viewed from another perspective, taken up again, altered, and continued further, then it

becomes visible whether it holds. What remains is not the isolated formulation, but the structure preserving itself throughout these movements.

What we are speaking of here is not free association, but irreversible *setzungen* following an internal logic. The system is placed under stress and repeatedly tested anew.

Knowledge here is therefore not primarily possession, but the result of stabilization under movement in relation. It is not found and held onto, but emerges as something that does not disappear in the process. This form of validation is, as mentioned, retrospective: only afterward does it become visible that a *setzung* was part of a sustainable structure. Before that, it is merely a moment within enactment, potentially as false as correct.

This form of validation does not replace classical procedures, but shifts the point at which stability is examined.

Precisely here lies the difference from classical procedures. Whereas there the attempt is made to minimize uncertainty before the statement, here uncertainty is integrated into the process. Validation occurs not through immobilization, but through continued movement. A structure counts as resilient when it cannot be destroyed by this movement. Not because it is protected, but because under pressure it reshapes itself without losing its coherence. This is why the author speaks of topology.

This form of cognition is not free of error. On the contrary: it presupposes irritation. But error does not appear here as an isolated false statement, but as instability over the course of the process. What cannot sustain itself disappears. What remains is not necessarily ultimately true, but neither is it arbitrary. It is the result of a process generating consistency across time without presupposing it from the beginning.

This also shifts the role of the cognizing subject. It is not the place where knowledge is stored, but part of a system within which knowledge emerges. The individual does not “know” in advance, but recognizes afterward that within action, writing, and thinking, structures have formed that are sustainable. In this sense, cognition is less an act of appropriation than a process of co-evolution between perception, action, and world.

What is reproducible within this model is not the result, but the operative structure through which results emerge.

One could also say that art requires a similar epistemology precisely because it only shows knowledge in enactment. The work is necessary not in order to communicate the knowledge an artist possesses, but in order for this knowledge to become real at all. Relevant for the respective *Eigenzeit*.

The difference from art lies in the fact that the resulting structures are not only aesthetically coherent, but capable of consistently describing external phenomena.

6. Delimitation: Cognition, Conditioning, Deficit, and Neurodivergence

The case described here suggests a structurally stable form of knowledge organization. This necessarily raises the question of what kind of cause can adequately explain such a pattern. This question is not optional, because without it the observed phenomena will naturally be assigned to interpretations that appear plausible, but do not sufficiently capture the structure of the material.

In the following, three common explanatory models are considered: psychological conditioning, deficit models in the sense of insufficient adaptation or inadequate education, and neurodivergence in the narrower sense. The aim is not to completely refute these models, but to determine their explanatory range in relation to the present material.

6.1 Psychological Conditioning

Psychological conditioning describes the effects of experience, socialization, and individual conflict on behavior, evaluation, and perception. It explains why certain contents are preferred, avoided, or emotionally charged. Characteristic of conditioning is its contextual dependence: it changes over time, adapts to new conditions, and generally shows variation, rupture, and compensation.

The pattern observed in the present case shows a different structure. The central operation — *setzung*, displacement, condensation, retrospective stabilization — appears independently of the respective context. It appears in linguistic productions, professional situations, social interactions, and institutional conflicts in comparable form. The contents vary; the operative structure remains.

This form of invariance cannot be explained through conditioning alone. Conditioning may intensify, modulate, or foreground certain thematic areas, but it does not explain the stable recurrence of the same structural organization across strongly divergent domains of life.

6.2 Deficit Models and Insufficient Adaptation

A second obvious explanation consists in interpreting the observed behavior as the expression of a deficit, for example in the sense of insufficient discipline, inadequate training, or lack of adaptability to existing requirements.

Deficit models generally imply a global reduction in capability. One would therefore expect reduced complexity, inconsistency, or an overall diminished ability for problem-solving.

The present material, however, shows a different picture. Under certain conditions — especially where autonomous movement, open problem structures, and not fully determined processes are possible — complex, cross-domain structures emerge and continue to develop consistently over longer periods of time. At the same time, under strongly predefined and standardized conditions, marked collapses of functionality occur.

This constellation is incompatible with a global deficit. It points instead toward a conditional functionality: capability is not generally reduced, but bound to specific structural conditions. Deficit models do not sufficiently grasp this selectivity, because they assume a relatively even distribution of ability or inability.

6.3 Neurodivergence

The category of neurodivergence, especially in the context of autism, offers an obvious descriptive level. Aspects such as strong internal logic, atypical processing of stimuli, difficulties with external control, and a close coupling between perception and cognition can partially be related to existing models.

At the same time, the present material shows properties extending beyond these descriptions. The observed structure concerns not only perception or behavior, but the organization of cognition itself. The issue is not primarily different contents or weightings, but another operative logic through which knowledge emerges, stabilizes itself, and is validated.

Existing models of neurodivergence frequently describe differences in processing speed, sensory filtering, or social cognition. However, they capture only to a limited degree the systematic production of complex knowledge structures that remain consistent across years and cannot be derived from linear learning or standardized procedures.

The present case therefore cannot be fully described within existing categories of neurodivergence. It stands in relation to them, but does not remain entirely within their explanatory reach.

Theories of neurodivergence and autism — with exceptions such as Veridical Mapping and Monotropism — still contain only few approaches capable of explaining the construction of a fractally organized body of work remaining stable across decades. Individual aspects are described, but not the total configuration in its operative interdependence.

This may indicate that neurodivergence itself must be understood differently, because there could exist an explanatory model that is more viable outside the medical framework. However, it is still too early to clarify such a claim.

6.4. Ethnological Explanations

Another possible field would be an ethnological perspective. One could draw comparisons here to the formation of cultures — forms of knowledge that do not emerge solely in written form, but across long periods of time through stories and processes collectively or individually enacted, binding high densities of complex information. This cognition has many advantages when it appears collectively, because it is substantially more open than classical academic, dialectical discourse cultures. It binds within the moment, within ritual, within immediacy, and may therefore require less external control. This is mentioned here only briefly.

6.5 Consequence of the Delimitation

The models considered here — conditioning, deficit, and neurodivergence — each provide partial aspects that make certain observations plausible. Yet none of these models is capable of fully explaining the combination of structural invariance, conditional functionality, and long-term, consistent production of knowledge.

From this follows a shift of perspective. Instead of treating the phenomenon as a variation within existing categories, it becomes necessary to change the level at which the description itself begins.

The decisive difference lies in the fact that what is involved here is not primarily a variation of properties, but a variation in the organization of operations. The central issue is not what is thought, but how thinking itself is structured.

This shift has immediate consequences for the evaluation of the material. What appears from the perspective of conditioning or deficit as deviation or disturbance may, from an operative perspective, be understood as a consistent, though non-compatible, form of knowledge organization.

The present case does not provide final proof for such a shift. It does, however, make visible that existing categories reach a limit at which they can no longer sufficiently grasp the observed phenomenon. At this boundary, another descriptive level becomes necessary.

7. Consequences for Cognition, Science, and Evaluation

If the form of cognition observed in the present case actually generates knowledge consistently, remains stable across long periods of time, proves itself under different contexts, and adequately describes real phenomena — as in the author's body of work —

then this has immediate consequences for fundamental assumptions concerning what cognition is and how it comes into being.

The first consequence concerns the status of scientific criteria themselves. Concepts such as objectivity, reproducibility, and proof appear in the classical understanding as necessary conditions of valid cognition. They define what can count as knowledge and what cannot. The case described here, however, suggests that these criteria are not universal, but bound to a particular form of cognitive organization.

This does not mean that they are wrong. It means that they are partial.

If knowledge also emerges under conditions in which subject and object are not separated, in which cognition is not secured prior to enactment but stabilizes itself only within the process, and in which validity emerges not through the repeatability of identical steps but through sustainability under variation, then the classical model can no longer remain the sole point of reference.

The second consequence concerns the structure of truth. In the classical model, truth is a property of statements. It is bound to sentences that can be verified under defined conditions. In the mode described here, this location shifts. Truth is not primarily localized within the sentence, but within the form stabilizing itself across time. An individual statement may appear unclear, exaggerated, or even contradictory. What becomes decisive is whether the underlying structure can maintain itself across different contexts without collapsing.

From this also follows a proximity to ethnological questions: Is knowledge bound to *Eigenzeit* in such a way that truth shifts into another temporal framework? Not as abstract fact, but as lived knowledge stabilizing itself across ruptures, generations, and processes of form-generation.

This also shifts the question of error. In the classical model, an error is a false statement that must be replaced by a better one. In the process-based mode, error appears as instability over the course of the process. What cannot sustain itself disappears. What remains has not proven itself through the exclusion of uncertainty, but through the integration of uncertainty.

The third consequence concerns the role of the subject. Classical science attempts to remove the cognizing subject from the process of cognition, or at least neutralize it. Subjectivity is treated as a disturbance variable. In the case described here, precisely this is impossible. Subjectivity is not an addition that can be removed, but part of the structure through which cognition emerges at all, because every subject generates a deviation through which structure becomes visible. The subject is not eliminated, but organized — through shifts of perspective, through self-rupture, through the permanent relativization of individual positions within the process.

If one measures this form of cognition using standards based on distance, linearity, and reproducibility, it necessarily appears deficient: unclear, inconsistent, difficult to

communicate, unreliable. At the same time, the present material shows that under appropriate conditions it consistently generates results standing in relation to real structures.

The question is therefore not whether this method produces or makes knowledge usable, but what it requires in order to do so. In the present case, classical education appears to contribute only to a limited degree.

A category error thereby emerges: a form of cognition is evaluated according to criteria not made for it.

The fourth consequence concerns the concept of work and performance. Within systems oriented toward the standardized reproduction of knowledge and behavior, a cognition bound to *Eigenzeit*, context, and movement is structurally disadvantaged. It cannot unfold its strengths there because the conditions under which it functions are systematically excluded. At the same time, within open and not fully determined contexts, it can produce highly complex performances that cannot be translated into classical systems of evaluation.

This leads to a systematic misjudgment: what appears as lack of capability is in many cases an incompatibility between cognitive mode and institutional structure.

The fifth consequence ultimately concerns science itself. If it is true that within the same cultural and conceptual space different protocols of cognition exist that cannot be fully translated into one another, then science is not unified, but plural in its cognitive foundation. This plurality has so far remained largely invisible because it is interpreted as deviation, error, or lack of competence.

The present case suggests that this interpretation is insufficient. The cognition described here has demonstrably produced useful knowledge that would not have been accessible in this form through classical methodology. One may think, for example, of the author's work in provoked empiricism within the context of researching violence by authorities. By personally living through these systems, he made their dynamics visible in a way external, predominantly quantitative observation could not grasp. The limit of classical procedures here lies not in their inaccuracy, but in the fact that they do not generate *Eigenzeit* and therefore observe systems primarily from the outside, whereas certain structures become readable only in enactment and movement.

The issue is not to establish a second science or replace existing procedures. It is to recognize that what counts as valid cognition is itself bound to conditions that are part of a specific cognitive mode. Once this mode can no longer be presupposed as self-evident, the framework itself shifts.

The decisive question is then no longer: Does this form of thinking correspond to established criteria?

But rather: Which forms of cognition remain hidden from us as long as we recognize only those criteria corresponding to a particular cognition?

The case described here provides no final answer to this question. It does, however, make visible that this question can no longer be ignored.

8. Form, Topology, and Morphogenesis: Knowledge as Structure in Enactment

The case described above suggests that knowledge cannot be understood exclusively as a propositional structure — that is, not merely as a set of statements that can be logically ordered and verified. Rather, a form of cognition becomes visible that is not primarily localized in the sentence itself, but in the way structures form, transform, and stabilize over time. Knowledge appears here not as information, but as form in process.

One possible way to sharpen this observation emerges through the concept of topology. In mathematics, topology describes the study of properties preserved under continuous deformation. What matters is not the exact shape of an object, but the structure remaining intact through stretching, compression, or displacement. If one cautiously transfers this idea to the present case, a parallel emerges: the patterns observed in both text and life trajectory display a stability not bound to concrete contents, but to relations and transitions.

The viability of this understanding depends in part on the question of whether nature and the universe themselves are organized through such orders — that is, through structures describable as topologies and at least partially readable through operatoric approaches. From this emerges the cautious hypothesis that patterns do not occur in isolation, but overlap, repeat, and interweave. Interdisciplinarity would then not merely be methodological, but structurally grounded: it would presuppose overlaps, self-similarities, and possibly fractal orders in which information can be reduced to patterns and morphology. If, by contrast, the world consisted exclusively of independent and clearly separable objects, such a methodology would necessarily remain self-referentially limited. The present material, however, suggests something different: knowledge here does not emerge at the object, but within the relation.

This means: in this mode, knowledge does not reside in individual statements, but in the way a configuration behaves under transformation. A structure counts as “recognized” when it organizes itself similarly under differing conditions, when it displays a form of invariance bound not to identity but to transformability. Cognition, in this sense, would be less a representation of the world than a grasping of formal continuity under variation.

This perspective can be extended through considerations of morphogenesis. In biological and physical contexts, morphogenesis describes the emergence of forms out of dynamic processes. Forms here are not pre-given, but emerge from interactions, local differences,

and tensions within a system. Transferred to cognitive processes, one could say: knowledge does not primarily emerge through the accumulation of information, but through continuous form-generation in the interplay of perception, action, and environment.

Within this context, *Eigenzeit* can be understood as that enactment through which a particular formation of the world becomes irreversible. Knowledge would then not be a universal statement across potentiality, but the consequence of condensation within a specific temporal trajectory.

Exactly such a dynamic becomes visible in the described case. Concepts are not first defined and then applied, but emerge within the process of use. This use is bound to concrete necessity and gains its formal stability precisely through this binding. Concepts transform, condense, disappear, and reappear in new constellations, yet what remains stable is not the wording, but the underlying structure. Knowledge is therefore not the result of a completed process, but the ongoing stabilization of a form proving itself under pressure, friction, and deviation.

This is also why the author's work appears like a *Gesamtkunstwerk* encompassing contents, the author's person, actions, and environment alike — a natural consequence if information resides not in the object, but in the field itself.

At this point, the concept of *Eigenzeit* enters more clearly. If knowledge does not exist independently of its process of emergence, but remains bound to it, then time is no longer merely a neutral frame, but constitutive of cognition itself. Time becomes a medium of cognition binding itself into form. *Eigenzeit*, in this context, describes the irreversible temporality of a process that cannot be arbitrarily accelerated, repeated, or externalized. Knowledge emerging within *Eigenzeit* cannot be fully separated from its enactment without losing its structure.

Consequently, it also cannot be separated from place, space, or persons.

This also explains why certain forms of validation fail to function here. If cognition is bound to irreversible processes, then it cannot be reproduced arbitrarily without altering the conditions themselves. In this cognitive mode, knowledge is always also a function of time; time is not merely a frame, but a condition of possibility for knowledge. This does not mean that cognition becomes arbitrary or purely subjective, but rather that its stability is bound to different criteria: recurrence under variation, sustainability across time, and connectability across differing contexts.

Similar dynamics, as previously indicated, can also be observed in cultural processes.

The present case suggests that such mechanisms may operate not only culturally, but individually as well. It shows that knowledge can emerge and stabilize through continuous interaction with world-structures without first being translated into explicit, abstract form. At the same time, it becomes visible how fragile this form of knowledge is within environments oriented toward different forms of stabilization.

It would be premature to transform these observations into a closed theory. What can nevertheless be stated is a shift of perspective: knowledge no longer appears primarily as a representation of the world, but as part of processes of form-generation simultaneously producing world, subject, and cognition. Knowledge thereby possesses a temporal dimension. What is meant is not linear development or falsification, but a transformation of the patterns from which knowledge can be read at all.

In this sense, form is not merely a carrier of knowledge, but itself a form of knowledge — not as stored information, but as a structure proving itself in enactment and preserving itself over time.

This perspective raises more questions than it answers. It nevertheless suggests that the investigation of cognition cannot end with statements alone, but must include the processes through which such statements emerge in the first place. The case described here is not proof of a general theory, but an indication that such processes exist and have thus far been insufficiently understood.

As shown, this form of cognition is bound to *Eigenzeit*. This means that it does not function independently of condition, energy, or context. Under conditions of external control, time pressure, or enforced linearity, access collapses. Conversely, under conditions of high concentration or emotional activation, large amounts of structure can become visible within very short periods of time. Knowledge is then not constructed step by step, but often appears abruptly as an already complex unity subsequently unfolded.

Embodied knowledge does not simply negate objectified knowledge, but shifts its conditions. It reveals the limits of exclusively externalizable and reproducible forms of knowledge, particularly where irreversibility, contextual binding, and *Eigenzeit* are systematically excluded.

The advantage of cognition bound to *Eigenzeit* lies in its capacity to grasp complex, non-linear relations without prematurely reducing them. Since the structure is not forced into a linear schema from the outset, more differences remain intact. Connections between domains separated within classical models can become directly visible. Concepts do not emerge from definitions, but from repeated use under varying conditions, thereby developing a high degree of connectability.

Another advantage lies in long-term coherence. Since stabilization does not occur punctually, but through repeated proving, structures emerge that remain consistent across years even when themes and contexts change. The work itself functions as a storage medium of this stability. Individual statements may shift, while the underlying structure remains recognizable.

The limitation of this mode lies in its restricted immediate communicability. Because meaning does not arise locally within the sentence, but across extended sequences, access becomes difficult for readers expecting linear and explicitly justified structures. In

addition, dependence on Eigenzeit becomes a limitation within environments demanding constant and reproducible performance.

Nevertheless, it becomes visible that under suitable conditions this form of cognition consistently generates knowledge capable of interacting with real phenomena. Its logic lies not in deduction, but in unfolding; its stability not in proof, but in sustainability and world-binding. Precisely therein lies its specificity.

9. Conclusion: A Shift, Not a Closure

The present text has not opened up a new object-domain. Nor has it presented a closed theory. What it shows is something else: a shift in the level at which cognition itself is described.

The point of departure was a case extending across existing categories. The observed structure cannot be sufficiently explained either as psychological conditioning, as deficit, or entirely as neurodivergence in the currently established sense. At the same time, a form of cognition becomes visible that consistently produces knowledge across decades, stabilizes it, and makes it applicable across differing contexts.

This creates a tension that can no longer be resolved by adapting the case to existing standards. The question shifts. It is no longer whether this form of cognition corresponds to established criteria, but whether those criteria themselves are complete.

The text has shown that knowledge does not necessarily begin in the sentence. It can emerge in enactment, stabilize itself through form, and derive its validity not from the reproducibility of identical steps, but from sustainability under variation. Under these conditions, truth no longer appears primarily as a property of isolated statements, but as the stability of structures across time.

This shift concerns not only theoretical questions. It directly affects the practice of science, the evaluation of work, and the conditions under which certain forms of cognition can become operative at all. What appears unclear, unreliable, or deficient may in fact prove structurally incompatible with dominant systems of evaluation without therefore being less capable.

The case described here is not proof of a general theory. Nor is it an argument against existing methods. It is an indication that forms of cognition exist which can only be insufficiently described within current conceptual frameworks.

The objection of circularity applies only to a limited extent in the present case, since the cognition described here does not derive its validation exclusively from itself. Stabilization does not occur through subjective self-confirmation, but through continuous confrontation with real structures, resistances, and consequences within the relational field. The mechanism of testing is not eliminated, but displaced: away from the

isolated reproducibility of individual statements and toward the sustainability of structures under variation, friction, and long-term world-binding. At the same time, the classical scientific model is itself not free of circularity, since its validation procedures already presuppose certain ontological assumptions regarding objectivity, separability, and repeatability. The difference therefore lies not between circular and non-circular systems, but between different forms of epistemic stabilization.

Whether this implies an expansion of scientific methodology, whether multiple protocols of cognition can coexist, or whether new forms of integration may emerge over time, remains open. The same applies to the question of whether phenomena such as autism or ADHD may have to be understood differently within such a framework. These questions cannot be decided in advance. They can only be clarified further through engagement with cases of this kind.

What can nevertheless be stated is the existence of a boundary. Wherever knowledge emerges without taking the path of distance, representation, and external validation, a domain begins that has so far remained only marginally visible. The present text does not render this domain fully explainable. It renders it visible.

And precisely therein lies its contribution.

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Operatoric Eigenzeit Profiles: Structural Incompatibility, Recursive Conflict Dynamics, and Emergent World-Binding

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Abstract

This paper develops the concept of operatoric eigenzeit profiles in order to describe forms of cognition that operate not primarily through functional adaptation to stabilized social systems, but through processual world-binding. Building on earlier work on process cognition and eigenzeit-based labour, the paper argues that certain neurodivergent cognitive configurations cannot be adequately understood within dominant representational, propositional, or diagnostically stabilized models of cognition.

Rather than treating cognition as the manipulation of abstract representations within predefined task spaces, the present study investigates cognition under conditions of structural incompatibility, institutional conflict, and recursive destabilization. It proposes that characteristics commonly interpreted as dysfunctions — including work incapacity, overcomplexity, communicative mismatch, withdrawal, or compulsive structure production — may instead emerge from conflicts between fundamentally different forms of world organization.

Drawing on long-term autoethnographic field research across labour relations, bureaucratic institutions, social conflicts, and artistic research practices, the paper identifies a recurring conflict dynamic in which externally imposed functional structures lead to the collapse of eigenzeit-based coherence, followed by emergent reorganization and renewed theory or structure production. These recursive cycles are interpreted not as isolated psychological events, but as manifestations of a stable relational operatoric.

The analysis further argues that dominant institutions systematically misinterpret world-binding forms of cognition because contemporary societies are primarily optimized for simulation, standardization, reversibility, and administratively legible productivity. In contrast, the examined cognitive profile operates more strongly through irreversible relational coupling, emergent condensation, and retrospective stabilization.

The paper situates these dynamics within the context of neurodivergent epistemology, enactivism, disability studies, systems theory, labour critique, and theories of epistemic violence. It concludes that the observed conflicts cannot be reduced either to individual pathology or to mere mutual misunderstanding, but instead point toward a deeper

structural incompatibility between emergent world-binding cognition and simulation-based institutional orders.

The proposed model is not intended as a closed explanatory system, but rather as a heuristic operatoric structure capable of generating empirically investigable predictions concerning long-term neurodivergent conflict dynamics, institutional incompatibility, and emergent reorganization under conditions of functional destabilization.

Keywords: operatoric cognition, eigenzeit, world-binding, neurodivergent epistemology, recursive conflict dynamics, structural incompatibility, emergent cognition, process cognition, retrospective stabilization, operatoric invariance, enactivism, structural violence, simulation-based society, functional stabilization, institutional conflict, neurodivergence, autism, AuDHD, epistemic violence, labour ontology, eigenzeit-based labour, emergent world-organization, relational coupling, recursive destabilization, process ontology, systems theory, disability studies, artistic research, world-formation, structural condensation, operatoric profiles, simulation versus world-binding, administrative cognition, emergent structure formation, non-representational cognition, irreversible form-formation, social complexity, cognitive morphology, epistemology of emergence, institutional misreading, neurodivergent labour, epistemic conflict, structural recurrence, world-organization, ontological incompatibility

1. Introduction

In most research settings, neurodivergence, divergent cognition, or autism are observed from the outside and investigated within frameworks that render conflicts, crisis trajectories, or structural incompatibilities visible only to a limited extent.

Questionnaires, clinical interviews, and even procedures such as ADOS-2 primarily generate preformatted observational situations or artificially bounded stress environments within short temporal intervals. As a result, cognition is almost inevitably observed under conditions of relative stabilization. Yet precisely those dynamics that emerge only under chronic overload, institutional escalation, social decoupling, or long-term conflict remain largely invisible within such frameworks.

As a consequence, a central dimension necessary for understanding the “why” and the “as a consequence of what” within certain cognitive processes is missing. Many of the characteristics that later become visible appear, when viewed in isolation, as symptoms, behavioural irregularities, or communicative peculiarities, although they may instead emerge from specific conflicts between different forms of world organization and therefore constitute logical — even rational — strategies within those conflicts. In order to observe such dynamics at all, a far broader temporal and structural context is required.

The present text attempts to approach this through a long-term observation of cognition in the field itself, across decades of institutional conflict, labour processes, crisis trajectories, theory production, and autobiographical documentation.

The particularity of this investigation lies in the fact that the author (neurodivergent) systematically examines his own cognition within everyday life. At first glance this may appear unusual; however, it possesses a decisive methodological advantage. Here, it is not merely an external system observing another cognition, but rather a specific form of cognition investigating its own operatoric processes directly in enactment. A kind of double condensation thereby emerges. On the one hand, it becomes visible how this cognition organizes reality from within conflicts themselves; on the other hand, the direct interior perspective enables a form of experimental self-observation that would scarcely be reproducible under external conditions. Many of the processes described here would otherwise appear from the outside only as diffuse irritation, overreaction, or inconsistent behaviour, while their internal operatoric logic would remain invisible.

At the same time, the dangers of such a method are obvious. The risks of circular self-confirmation, selective perception, or theoretical overdetermination of one's own material are fully acknowledged by the author. For precisely this reason, the present work does not claim final truths nor attempt to construct a closed explanatory system. Instead, it aims at the collection of material, the condensation of recurring structures, the documentation of recursive patterns, and the exposure of contradictions within existing models. The text therefore does not understand itself as classical quantitative research, but rather as a long-term investigation (30 years) of a boundary-profile that partially escapes established research strategies because its central dynamics emerge precisely where standardized observational spaces begin to collapse.

The author notes already at this point that the cognition described in the opening sections of this paper may initially appear subtle and therefore easy to assimilate into familiar explanatory frameworks. Only later does it become clear that a rupture is present here that cannot easily be explained. The implications are substantial.

The present paper builds upon the investigations developed in *Thinking in Formation*, *Work under Eigenzeit*, and *They Cannot Understand*, while also standing in relation to *Operatoric World-Binding and the Crisis of Stabilization*. It serves as a further condensation of the operatoric profile described across those works.

But what exactly is at stake here?

The central observation of this paper is that the described conflicts do not occur in isolation, but reproduce themselves across entirely different areas of life in strikingly similar forms. The same tensions reappear — in labour, language, science, social relations, interactions with institutions, crisis dynamics, temporal organization, and even within the form of theory production itself. The self-similarity of these formations appears fractal, almost holographic. Each partial aspect contains formal similarities to all others. The structure behaves like a morphogenetic block or topology. The question

therefore shifts fundamentally. The issue is no longer merely personality, psychological traits, or isolated symptoms, but rather the possibility that different operative forms of reality organization are colliding with one another. These domains are treated fractally in similar ways because they appear to follow a shared topological order.

Importantly, the present text does not describe autism or neurodivergence simply as “another perception of the same reality.” Many existing models implicitly assume that the same social and material world remains fundamentally identical, while differences arise primarily through perceptual filtering, sensory processing, attention, or social interpretation. The material examined here, however, points toward something more radical. The difference appears to exist partly already at the level of world organization itself. What is meant here is the internal order of form-formation. The fractal, topological, and operatoric structure raises fundamental questions concerning what subjectivity actually is. The central difference no longer concerns merely how reality is perceived, but how reality is operatorically stabilized, coupled, condensed, and brought forth in enactment at all. Within the cognition presented here, the same conflicts do not merely reproduce themselves locally in communication or behaviour; they reproduce structurally. This structural dimension does not generate a mere private reality or subjective interior world, but rather recurring relational invariances that couple themselves across fields to real problem-spaces and thereby become capable of producing intersubjectively connectable forms of knowledge — though not through classical objectivist distancing, but through operatoric coherence within ongoing enactment.

The concept of cognition employed in this paper must therefore not be understood in the narrow psychological sense of isolated thinking within the head. What is meant instead is a deeper operatoric structure that simultaneously organizes perception, temporality, labour, knowledge, social coupling, and world-relation itself. Precisely for this reason, the same patterns reproduce themselves across domains that could scarcely be connected through psychology alone. What becomes visible is not merely a character trait, but a specific operative dynamic of emergent world-binding.

Within the profile examined here, knowledge does not arise primarily through linear deduction, explicit planning, or the stepwise verification of individual propositions, as is typically presupposed in dominant representational and propositional models of cognition. Instead, a different dynamic becomes visible. By “dynamic” is meant a different architecture within which thinking and acting appear fundamentally differently organized.

Knowledge frequently begins here with what could be described as a non-derived operative placement — a structural positioning that is initially neither fully justified nor locally stabilized. Only retrospectively does it often become visible that the placement possessed its own necessity. In practice, this proves highly unusual, though it also offers logical advantages. Such placements subsequently shift through displacement, as meanings, levels, and relations become reorganized and coupled across different contexts. A kind of triangulation of space, action, thought, and identity emerges. Clarity

does not arise primarily through reduction, but through condensation — through the densification of relational structures across longer process chains.

This form of monotropic binding, in which patterns are compulsively deepened in relation to space and time, initially resembles a typical autistic profile. Yet the clinical framework of autism generally recognizes only symptoms, not the coherent experiential meaning-context of the process itself.

The starting point of the epistemic process is therefore not rational clarification alone, nor merely the ordering of patterns, but rather difference and destabilization. At the same time, shifts between levels frequently occur. A thought may be answered through an action, while an action itself becomes the carrier of conceptual content. Forms and their relations are negotiated, though not as fixed objects.

This has profound consequences for language and formulation.

Knowledge and truth are grasped and communicated far more strongly through relations and relational structures. Yet this does not occur through arbitrary association, but rather through a logical progression in which processes of form-formation are directly read, manipulated, reread, condensed, and tested.

The cognition uses itself as a tool. It uses the entire space, its own identity, embodiment, and temporality as instruments. Consequently, no stable exterior perspective emerges in which a person gazes upon the environment as mere backdrop. Person and environment are instead far more tightly coupled and far less rigidly separated from one another.

What becomes visible, then, is a mode of engaging with knowledge that is embodied, world-bound, and governed by *eigenzeit*. *Eigenzeit* refers here to irreversible processes unfolding through distortions that arise as conditions of existence itself, because every placement shifts the entire relational field. When personhood is not experienced as separate from space and time, neither person nor environment remains stable; existence takes place within the interval between them.

In order to prevent an alienization of this cognition, it must be stated clearly that, like many forms of cognition, it does not appear strange in every mundane moment of everyday life — while brushing one's teeth or sitting on the toilet, for example. These phenomena become most visible at boundary-zones: within labour processes, stress situations, thinking processes, emotional intensifications, and similar conditions.

Otherwise, the reader may quickly drift into a caricatured image. Autistic people, too, often appear entirely unremarkable across many everyday domains.

But how does this cognition secure knowledge, and what counts as truth for it at all?

The stabilization of such structures occurs retrospectively. The validity of an insight does not reveal itself in advance through formal verification, but only through temporal persistence, recurrence under variation, structural coherence, and the capacity of an order to maintain invariance despite transformation. The entire field is worked through,

such that processes of knowledge simultaneously become processes of world-binding. Whereas dominant majority cognition often organizes knowledge through explicit deduction, local consistency, and anticipatory validation, knowledge here appears as an *eigenzeit*-bound process of emergent structure formation.

What generates knowledge from difference functions poorly within teamwork — that is, within cognitive and organizational processes oriented toward predefined goals. This cognition requires a high degree of self-determination. Form is continuously translated into information and information back into form, while difference itself is read out. It is as though everything were passed through a filter of morphogenetic laws in order to generate new knowledge and simultaneously new forms from the resulting differences. The world is ground against itself, tested, and whatever remains cannot belong to another world; rather, it has absorbed the order of this world while simultaneously transforming it. One can already see why autonomy is decisive here. *Eigenzeit* can only be collectivized to a limited extent.

This cognition reads from differences rather than from stabilized objects and their maintenance.

This operatoric difference does not remain confined to abstract knowledge. It inevitably generates conflicts with social and institutional orders that organize reality primarily through predictability, functional legibility, standardization, and anticipatory control. The profile examined here, by contrast, operates more strongly through relational condensation, irreversible coupling, and retrospective stabilization. As a result, what emerges are not merely different communication styles or opinions, but partially incompatible forms of reality organization themselves.

Highly stabilized systems resist being reshaped by the world or by individuals, whereas the cognition described here can stabilize itself existentially only through precisely such reshaping.

It must proceed in the way it proceeds. This renders external control difficult.

As the author's broader body of work across thirty years of research demonstrates, the differently organized relation to reality and worldhood cannot be overlooked. Yet it is not primarily the contents or conclusions that diverge from normative structures, but rather the processes through which they are reached.

In everyday life, these conflicts frequently appear as work incapacity, social irritation, overcomplexity, institutional escalation, withdrawal, or chronic misinterpretation. Within a broader perspective, however, they may represent — this being the central thesis — manifestations of deeper ontological tensions between different modes of world organization.

Crucially, the issue here is not occasional intuition, isolated creative episodes, or generally familiar forms of associative thinking. Such phenomena occur in attenuated forms in many people. What characterizes the profile examined here is the structural

dominance of the same operatoric dynamic across entirely different domains. The described processes organize not merely isolated moments of insight, but labour capacity, temporal perception, social interaction, crisis processing, institutional conflict, and long-term theory and structure production themselves.

This produces profound ruptures in everyday life.

Across thirty years of material, the impression therefore consolidates of a stable operatoric pattern that reproduces itself under continually changing conditions across decades. The cognition described here thus appears not as a mere variation within an otherwise identical majority cognition, but as a partially differently organized form of world-relation itself.

It is called world-relation because the ruptures emerge predominantly at the interface between individual and environment.

Furthermore, the observed dynamic does not remain local. The same patterns reappear — as already noted — in language, labour, perception, research, social relations, temporal organization, and institutional conflicts alike. What remains stable are not particular contents or behaviours, but the manner in which perception, tension, reorganization, knowledge, and world-relation are organized. Precisely this recurrence under variation is why the author does not speak merely of personality traits or individual preferences. The observed structure behaves instead like an operative invariance that reproduces itself independently of the respective context.

And it does so through the necessity of continuous differentiation, deviation, and transformation.

2. Entanglement Clusters in Causal Context within the Field

The following field protocol serves as a condensation-space for the dynamics that are later described theoretically. It is introduced deliberately at an early stage because the operatoric structure could otherwise easily be subsumed into existing autism or personality models. What becomes visible here is not merely subjective experience, but the recursive reproduction of the same conflict and reorganization dynamics across labour, institutions, knowledge production, and social reality itself.

The following protocol must not be read as a universal description of neurodivergent experience. Rather, it serves as a condensation-space of a specific boundary-profile within which the conflict dynamics later described theoretically become visible at particularly high intensity. What follows is, in a sense, the pre-reflective stage of the author's epistemic mechanics — prior to editing, translational smoothing, or masking:

“Authorities in Germany expect people in precarious situations to look for a job. The entire system is structured as though everyone were capable of performing

at least simple forms of labour, which creates the appearance that there are no real barriers as long as one does not display an obvious disability. This expectation has always presented a severe problem for me. Because it blocks me completely. All of these prefabricated pathways and actions instinctively appear false to me, and not only false — I feel this physically. I become immediately incapable of acting. This is not fundamentally an intellectual problem, nor simply a question of motivation, because neither resolves the issue.

Whenever I develop strategies, they always become strategies that lead me into actions producing friction, misunderstandings, or feelings of otherness in those around me. The question 'How do I find a job?' therefore never leads to the question of what is expected, because I cannot bring myself into alignment with those expectations. Instead, it leads to a reinvention of the respective job within the difference between myself and what that job is assumed to be. This happens automatically. I cannot consciously control it otherwise.

Over the years, this dynamic intensifies further and further because my biography consequently consists almost entirely of detours that can no longer be explained within any conventional job application from an employer's perspective. Added to this is an immediate dysfunctionality whenever I attempt to conform. I make mistakes, unintentionally damage company equipment, can no longer think clearly, and immediately enter a kind of emotional downward spiral resembling acute depression, which drains all energy from me. It is as though all my abilities are instantly withdrawn the moment I am expected to function according to external determination.

This does not merely produce blockage. It is as though my neurology directly prevents me from functioning under external control. This is therefore not a conscious process. Adapting myself feels more comparable to having sex with a gender that does not correspond to one's own orientation. It is a bodily intrusion that triggers an inner defence response. And an inner emptiness and loss of self.

Yet this defence is precisely not work refusal in the conventionally assumed sense. Instead, every situation leads to a restart of self-determined labour alongside the expectations imposed upon me. This goes so far that, after rejection, I simply continue doing the work without pay that emerged precisely from experiencing how I do not fit, cannot comply, yet nevertheless perceive something requiring correction — some inconsistency within the system itself. I then work on this inconsistency for days, weeks, months, or years.

In doing so, I follow the internal logic of that moment and work with the situation, the space, and the people involved — but without their consent. Yet I cannot communicate otherwise. Because doing so on their level would destroy the order itself. By this I mean within their relation to reality and order. There is no possibility of directly connecting unless the others enter into the process

themselves. But they usually do not, because what I do does not resemble work or bureaucratic order.

They regard what I do as wrong, and I experience them in precisely the same way. I cannot live without making these corrections, without entering the process, because I exist only within it. The process is existential for me. It is the habitat itself. I live within these orders. Yet I do not possess them or control them. It is an order that acts indirectly and becomes visible only in enactment. For this reason, it initially appears vague or unclear to others, which causes them to resist it.

Thus, no matter what I attempt, I always appear to them as wrong, different, or dangerous. They constantly tell me to find a job — or imply this — but this is impossible because jobs require actions that, within my experience, do not feel true. They feel false because they occur outside relational context: fragmented, simulated, unreal, abstract, and wrong. I cannot act against my own body. I cannot continually injure myself.

For them, it is effort, but not this kind of pain. It does not destroy them. My motivation always leads me toward making a new placement, generating a new difference, and thereby becoming highly productive. But I become productive only within difference, and in most jobs difference is forbidden. Consequently I am blocked everywhere.

The response is always to begin a new process two minutes later in an attempt to recalibrate the world again. I reorganize relations into new formations. When I finish, I have not built a product but a deviation that itself becomes a process — a process involving the observer, the respective company, or the respective authority. In this way I attempt connection. I say: ‘Here is an interesting new order. Could we not work on it together, and you pay me for it?’

Rejection follows. Two minutes later I begin another process, write two books in half a year, make a feature film, or investigate further formations. But this does not happen abruptly. I continue stabilizing orders and inconsistencies, correcting errors, and rearranging structures. I leave behind a trail of knowledge in the sand. Yet because others cannot explain how this knowledge emerged — and because no status is attached to it, but on the contrary I lacked permission or assignment to produce it — it is ignored and treated as a foreign body.

Two minutes later I begin a displaced new process in order to stabilize the order again.

Many authorities remain in permanent conflict with me, and I with them. They expect me to function in a specific manner while completely ignoring the work I have continuously performed for decades across thousands of pages of research and artistic production. We are incompatible.

No matter what I say or do, it is always interpreted as refusal or attack. What they expect of me within power relations where I occupy the weaker position is something I cannot fulfil, although they insist that everyone can do it. Thus they punish me, reduce my income, keep me below the poverty threshold, and damage my health. This has continued for decades.

I work every day, forty hours a week, unpaid. I investigate these conditions, publish, and produce work, yet I am not paid because, for them, this activity must not possess value — because this is supposedly not how value is created.

The dynamic reaches the point where the opposing side structurally renders me invisible. When I show them a text, it is as though they see only a blank sheet of paper. They respond according to their order, but their order makes no sense to me. Two minutes later I develop an entire body of work about it, writing for days, weeks, or years. I return, present everything, and they reject it all.

I say that this is work, but they do not understand. They see only errors and irritations. Yet there is no translation. There is no bridge. There is no resolution. They occupy the dominant position. They determine how much money I receive in order to live.

When I say that this is violence, they do not believe me, because they assume it is reasonable to expect me to work. I survive this through the next process, which gives me energy, orientation, clarification, and a position within the world. These stages are necessary for me in order to become capable of acting at all and in order to act coherently.”

2.1 The Pattern Is Not a State, but a Recursive Cycle

This is how the dynamic appears when the author no longer operates under strong masking, control, or functional smoothing. The process-flow remains continuously active. It does not appear merely as a personality trait, but as an epistemic mode of organization that binds world through *eigenzeit*. Knowledge emerges here not primarily through distance and objectification, but through participation, difference, and relational coupling. Reality stabilizes itself within lived tensions, ruptures, ambiguities, and contradictions. Truth therefore organizes itself less as a static object than as a relational coherence capable of sustaining ongoing world-binding.

What becomes visible is a recursive cycle of structural incompatibility. Dominant institutional systems generate expectations of functional adaptation within standardized systems of labour, administration, and social order. It is precisely here that the *eigenzeit*-based organization of the cognition described in this paper collides with administrative external timing. The consequence is not merely resistance or unwillingness, but an actual collapse of functional compatibility.

What is decisive, however, is that this collapse does not end in passivity. The energy does not disappear. It reorganizes itself along intrinsic structural bindings. What institutionally appears as withdrawal, dysfunction, or refusal of work often marks the transition into a phase of emergent reorganization. It is precisely there that new theory-production, books, films, models, or long-term investigations emerge (see the author's body of work). Cognition begins almost immediately to generate new forms of order out of the difference that has appeared.

Difference therefore functions not merely as a disturbance of the system, but as a condition of existence. The cognition described here requires a minimum degree of openness, deviation, and non-closure in order to remain capable of action at all. This collides continuously with systems that depend upon rapid stabilization, unambiguous categorization, and functional closure. *Eigenzeit* unfolds here precisely through irreversible structural processes emerging from difference and recalibration.

The next conflict is therefore already prepared. Sooner or later, emergent production attempts once again to establish connection with institutional fields. It is precisely there that renewed misreading occurs. Intensity appears as aggression, structural condensation as grandiosity, complex reorganization as uncooperativeness or refusal. Sanction, exclusion, and delegitimization follow, further intensifying structural decoupling. The cycle begins again.

A crucial aspect of this process is that this cognition necessarily personalizes the world. Reality must be emotionally lived through in order to become structurally binding. Emotion does not appear here as the opposite of rationality, but as an expression of high relational coupling. The stronger the binding, the higher the energetic intensity. Out of this emerge new placements, new differences, and new emergent orders — always tied back to concrete relationships and actual world-relations.

This marks a central point: sanction does not destroy productivity. It displaces it. Dominant institutions recognize productivity primarily where it remains functionally exploitable, controllable, standardized, and administratively legible. The productivity described here organizes itself through emergent, *eigenzeit*-based, and nonlinear processes. It often becomes strongest precisely where functional stabilization collapses. Productivity emerges less through adaptation to predefined formats than through relational condensation within open-ended processes.

For this reason, it frequently remains invisible within dominant institutions. More than this, it becomes structurally exploited. Modern societies benefit enormously from neurodivergent forms of structure-production — one need only think of the many highly productive and innovative figures whose lives were marked by profound ruptures in relation to the status quo — while simultaneously excluding those contributions from dominant systems of reward and legitimacy.

This produces a massive perceptual and translational error. What the system reads as “doing nothing” may in reality constitute highly complex reorganization. Withdrawal

appears as passivity while intense condensation of knowledge is simultaneously taking place. “Does not work” often means only that production is not occurring within administratively legible formats. Even communicative escalations frequently arise from attempts to stabilize incompatible processes simultaneously.

The conflict therefore consists — a thesis that will be further specified in the following sections — not merely between differing opinions or temperaments, but between different forms of reality-organization. Dominant systems operate primarily through functional legibility, comparability, and anticipatory control. The cognition described here organizes itself very differently. What emerges is a structural breakdown of translation itself.

Equally striking is the unusual crisis-resilience of this dynamic. Many people collapse under long-term sanctioning or institutional devaluation. The operatoric dynamic described here appears almost specialized in generating new forms of structure-production out of conflict itself. Each breakdown produces new emergent order. Conflict becomes epistemic fuel.

In this respect, the dynamic partially resembles dissipative systems in Ilya Prigogine, Gregory Bateson’s “difference that makes a difference,” Gilbert Simondon’s concept of individuation, or certain forms of neurodivergent hyperfocus and artistic research. The difference, however, is that the dynamic described here does not appear episodic, but stably recursive. Recursion itself forms continuity. History stabilizes the present.

The actual problem therefore consists not merely in disagreement or failed inclusion. Once the logic of this cognition is taken seriously, central societal categories begin to destabilize. Job-center logics no longer appear neutral, but as specific forms of functionalist world-organization. Poverty no longer appears merely as individual failure. Diagnostic models lose their apparent self-evidence. Definitions of performance become unstable. Science no longer appears as a neutral observational space, but as a specific form of epistemic stabilization. Administration loses its implicit monopoly over determining what counts as real work, productivity, or knowledge.

This is precisely why the dynamic described here is often intuitively experienced as an attack, even when the author, from his own perspective, is attempting to act as constructively as possible. Every emergent reorganization simultaneously shifts the ontological architecture of the field. Institutional interventions therefore frequently intensify precisely those dynamics they attempt to suppress. Pressure toward wage labour leads to structural collapse. Sanctions intensify decoupling. Delegitimization intensifies autonomous production. Exclusion generates deeper theory-development. Non-recognition leads to further operatoric condensation.

Within the present context, “operatoric” does not refer to an isolated mental ability, but to the way perception, action, temporality, and relational coupling jointly generate and stabilize structure.

The patterns becoming visible here may therefore reveal less about the author than about the structure of modern world-organization itself.

By blocking such forms of cognition, the normative system paradoxically produces its own unreadability, its own escalation, and ultimately its own critique. What emerges is a feedback-loop of structural incompatibility within which both sides remain epistemically implicated in the larger rupture.

When eigenzeit-organized process cognition is permanently forced into functionalist external timing, the result is therefore not merely individual crisis, but recursive dynamics of action-blockade, institutional conflict, emergent autonomous structures, breakdowns of translation, and alternative forms of structure-production.

If the model sketched here is even partially correct, modern societies would systematically generate situations in which highly productive forms of cognition:

- appear dysfunctional,
- are economically destroyed,
- remain institutionally unreadable,
- are diagnostically misinterpreted,
- and can scarcely be represented within existing legal frameworks.

In that case, the issue would no longer concern merely a marginal question of isolated neurotypes, but a structural problem within the architecture of modern society itself.

3. Contrasting Operatoric Tendencies

The conflict dynamics described previously often appear in everyday life as psychological, social, or institutional problems. In reality, however, they reproduce themselves with striking structural similarity across entirely different domains. For precisely this reason, a purely behavioural or clinical description is no longer sufficient. What becomes visible instead is a difference in the way reality itself is organized, stabilized, and epistemically accessed.

Within dominant societal stabilization systems, reality appears primarily as an objectively existing and representable order. Perception serves mainly as orientation within already stabilized social and functional spaces. The cognition described here, by contrast, organizes itself more strongly through relational process-coupling. Reality appears less as a finished object than as something that emergently stabilizes itself within ongoing world-binding and world-formation. Truth therefore organizes itself less through consensus-capacity or formal correctness than through structural viability and long-term coherence.

Misreadings frequently emerge where different forms of knowledge-production are confused with their respective concepts of truth. The mode described here organizes truth relationally and processually, whereas dominant academic systems organize it primarily through objectifiability, comparability, and reproducible stabilization. What appears from a processual perspective as necessary openness often appears within propositional systems as instability or irrationality. Conversely, the author experiences the strong object-centredness of classical science itself as a form of alienated world-relation. The irritation is therefore reciprocal.

The difference already becomes visible at a fundamental operatoric level:

Dominant Stabilization Eigenzeit World-Binding

representation	relational coupling
role identity	emergent structural binding
control	coherence
consensus-capacity	structural viability

This contrast is not intended as an absolute typology of people or groups, but as a way of making different operatoric tendencies visible.

Temporality is likewise organized differently. Dominant systems structure time administratively, segmentally, and synchronously. Productivity is expected to remain constantly available, plannable, and socially coordinatable. The cognition described here operates more strongly through eigenzeit. Development appears not as linear, but as emergent and condensational. Decisions often mature implicitly over long periods before abruptly tipping into new structural formations. Time-pressure therefore functions not primarily as motivation, but as a destabilization of underlying structural coherence.

This becomes particularly visible in the domain of labour. Within functionalist systems, work appears primarily as interchangeable fulfilment of function in exchange for wages. Motivation is organized extrinsically, while performance is defined through efficiency, comparability, and administrative legibility. The cognition described here organizes work instead as irreversible world-binding. Productivity emerges less through adaptation to predefined task-spaces than through relational condensation within open processes. Motivation follows not external reward, but the structural necessity of emergent coupling itself.

Functionalist Labour	Eigenzeit Labour
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controllable	emergent
modular	condensational
extrinsically motivated	structurally bound
short-term exploitable	long-term coherent

Similar differences appear in language and communication. Dominant forms of communication organize language primarily as a means of social synchronization and information transfer. Social compatibility frequently takes precedence over density of meaning. The cognition described here uses language instead as a space of operatoric condensation. Communication serves less for social stabilization than for shared structure- and knowledge-formation. Conflicts therefore emerge less from violations of social rules than from loss of meaning, structural fragmentation, or enforced simplification.

Dominant Communication	Operatoric Communication
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social coordination	condensation of meaning
compatibility	structural precision
rhetorical metaphor	operatoric metaphor

Scientific knowledge is likewise organized differently within both dynamics. Dominant scientific models privilege distance, reproducibility, and controlled methodological stabilization. Knowledge emerges primarily through explicit hypothesis-formation, comparability, and controlled verification. The cognition described here operates instead through long-term problem-coupling, recursive condensation, and emergent reorganization. Theory appears less as an abstract model about data than as a condensed structure of real experiential and conflictual spaces.

Theory is therefore not merely formulated, but lived through. This should not, however, be confused with mere subjectivity. The subjective position itself is continuously recalibrated and consciously used as a differential within the movement of knowledge-production. Knowledge emerges here not despite involvement, but partially through it.

Precisely for this reason, the dynamic described here frequently collides with institutional orders. Administration, diagnostics, and bureaucracy necessarily reduce reality to standardized categories. Complexity must be simplified, behaviour classified, and communication rendered administratively legible. For the cognition examined here, such processes often appear instead as a loss of structural reality. Rules appear legitimate

only where they preserve relational coherence. Where this no longer occurs, massive translational and conflictual dynamics emerge.

Institutional Legibility Operatoric Coherence

standardization	relational precision
classification	process-binding
functional order	real structural coupling
administrative control	emergent coherence

Perception and sensory organization likewise differ. Dominant cognition filters perception more strongly according to functional relevance. The cognition described here often exhibits a deeper coupling between perception, meaning, and structural condensation. Environment no longer appears merely as background for action, but as a space actively participating in structural formation. Overload therefore emerges less quantitatively than through the condensation of incompatible processes and meaning-spaces.

The truly significant aspect of these contrasts does not lie in the individual differences themselves. None of the described characteristics would appear particularly unusual in isolation. Process-oriented thinking, intense interests, problems with external timing, or strong intrinsic motivation are long-familiar phenomena in themselves. What is decisive instead is the recurrence of the same operatoric ground-structure across entirely different domains.

The dynamic described here therefore appears not merely as a more intense expression of familiar autistic characteristics, but partially as a displacement of the fundamental relation between cognition, reality, and world-formation itself. Process precedes representation, binding precedes function, emergence precedes planning, eigenzeit precedes external timing, and coherence precedes social compatibility. It is precisely this repetition under variation that generates the impression of a deeper operatoric mode of organization simultaneously structuring perception, knowledge, labour, temporality, and social reality.

The consequences do not remain local. The same operatoric dynamic generates friction across nearly all areas of the author's life. At the same time, the same operatoric regularities repeatedly appear both in the form of thinking itself and in the resulting research outputs. Inner world, embodiment, labour, and research no longer appear separate, but as different manifestations of the same process-logic. The ruptures do not emerge from two separate realities, but from two different modes of stabilization.

The question therefore increasingly shifts away from:

“What characteristics does this person possess?”

toward:

“What form of world-formation organizes perception, truth, labour, temporality, and social reality here so consistently that the same tensions and formational processes recur across decades?”

It is striking that fragments of this dynamic can already be found across numerous other research fields — although usually separated from one another and rarely condensed in this way. Critiques of industrial temporal regimes describe conflicts between living process-time and administrative timing. Feminist care theories point toward forms of relational labour that remain systematically invisible within market-centred systems of value. Disability Studies and neurodivergent epistemologies address structural misreadings of divergent forms of cognition. Similar tensions also appear within autism research itself, for example in discussions surrounding monotropism, the Double Empathy Problem, or sensory overcoupling.

Likewise, in the work of Gregory Bateson, Francisco Varela, Alva Noë, and enactivist approaches more broadly, knowledge no longer appears primarily as abstract representation of a finished external world, but as relational coupling between organism and world in enactment itself. Similar structural problems also emerge in postcolonial critiques of knowledge, theories of epistemic violence, and critiques of standardized science, where particular forms of knowledge become systematically invisible because they do not conform to dominant formats of epistemic legibility.

Even within physics, biology, and morphogenesis, the focus increasingly shifts away from static object-concepts toward process, emergence, field dynamics, and irreversible form-production. What these approaches share is less a unified theoretical programme than the growing erosion of a worldview treating reality primarily as an accumulation of stable, separable objects.

The interesting aspect of the profile described here therefore lies not in the absolute novelty of individual elements. What appears new is the density of their coupling within a single recursive pattern reproducing itself simultaneously across labour, knowledge, temporality, social reality, and institutional conflict.

If this is even partially correct, then similar recursive conflict-patterns should also be observable in other forms of long-term neurodivergent structural coupling — particularly wherever eigenzeit-based process organization collides permanently with functionalist external timing.

The present text therefore should not be understood as a closed theory, but as a heuristic condensation of a possible structural problem that remains only fragmentarily visible within existing models.

Dominant Narrative Operatoric Reading

“disorganized”	eigenzeit collides with external timing
“unable to work”	incompatible with functionalist labour
“too complex”	resistance to aggressive reduction
“refuses adaptation”	protection of structural integrity

Conflicts therefore no longer appear within this model as random isolated events or singular maladaptations, but as recurring consequences of the same structural difference. What becomes visible is an internal logic attempting to understand the world, to act meaningfully within it, and to establish both self-location and world-binding.

3.1 Why Classical Research Rarely Sees These Dynamics

Dominant research approaches investigate neurodivergence, autism, and cognitive difference primarily under conditions of relative stabilization. This includes short diagnostic situations, standardized questionnaires, clinical interviews, or institutionally regulated observational settings within which behaviour remains comparable, categorizable, and methodologically controllable. Almost inevitably, this produces a specific image of cognition: what becomes visible are mainly behavioural traits, communicative peculiarities, sensory irregularities, stereotyped patterns, or functional limitations within already existing social formats.

Precisely those dynamics, however, that only become visible under conditions of structural incompatibility remain largely invisible within such settings. Long-term conflicts with institutions, recursive escalation-loops, collapses under external timing, chronic decoupling from functionalist labour, or massive emergent production of theory and structure can scarcely be captured within short standardized observational windows. The same applies to the formation of eigenzeit-based parallel orders that organize themselves not locally, but across entire life-trajectories.

Yet these processes are central for understanding the profile examined here. Many visible characteristics do not appear in isolation, but emerge as consequences of specific conflict-spaces between different forms of world-organization. What appears within stabilized diagnostic environments as social irritation, dysregulation, or overreaction may, under long-term conditions, form part of a far more complex dynamic of reorganization. The visible symptoms would then no longer represent primary causes, but secondary effects of structural incompatibility.

These symptoms do not appear randomly. Their relational orientation does not stand outside the history of scientific knowledge itself, but touches upon fundamental tensions between process-oriented and objectifying models of truth.

Classical research understandably privileges controlled, comparable, and as far as possible reversible situations. Scientific stabilization requires repeatability, comparability, and reduction of uncontrolled variables. Yet this also marks a structural limit. The profile investigated here reveals its actual dynamics precisely where stabilization breaks down: under chronic overload, within institutional conflicts, under conditions of epistemic misreading, in situations of existential insecurity, or wherever incompatible world-orders are forced into relation with one another.

At the same time, it is precisely under such conditions that highly intensive dynamics of reorganization and innovation frequently emerge.

Only within such situations does it become visible how certain operatoric patterns reorganize themselves. External timing no longer produces merely stress, but partial collapse of previous forms of coupling. Simultaneously, new emergent orders, theory-productions, or forms of relational condensation arise out of these breakdowns themselves. The dynamic therefore does not proceed linearly. Crisis and reorganization instead form recursive processes that continuously generate one another.

This does not mean that existing research methodologies are fundamentally wrong. They investigate cognition primarily within stabilized spaces. The material examined here, by contrast, investigates cognition at the boundaries of such spaces — that is, precisely where existing stabilization systems lose coherence and emergent reorganization becomes necessary in the first place.

It is precisely from this that structural translational problems emerge between different forms of world-organization.

In this sense, classical research primarily investigates cognition within already existing world-orders, whereas the profile described here becomes visible precisely where different forms of world-organization collide. Bias therefore does not appear accidental, but partially structurally embedded within the observational conditions themselves.

More recent approaches such as monotropism, dynamical systems theory, or ecological psychology already shift cognition partially away from modular information-processing toward processual coupling between organism and environment. Nevertheless, many empirical investigations still remain methodologically confined within short stabilized observational settings, making recursive long-term dynamics of structural incompatibility difficult to observe.

If the model proposed here is even partially correct, one would expect certain recursive dynamics to be systematically underestimated within classical short-term diagnostics. They should instead become more visible within longitudinal observation under conditions of institutional instability, chronic external timing, or enforced functional

adaptation. Likewise, one would expect institutional sanctioning in certain neurodivergent profiles not primarily to reduce productivity, but rather to intensify decoupling from administratively legible forms of labour.

Precisely such dynamics could help explain why highly intensive structure-production and institutional dysfunction emerge not despite one another, but partially through the same recursive dynamic of incompatibility itself.

3.2 From Profile to Recursive Conflict Dynamics

The preceding analysis could create the impression that what is described here merely constitutes an alternative personality profile within existing models of autism or neurodivergence, or simply a particular mode of individual perception. The material examined here, however, points toward something else. The described characteristics do not appear as a static condition, but as a recursive conflict dynamic.

What emerges is not a random accumulation of isolated conflicts, but a recurring operatoric sequence. Certain conditions repeatedly generate similar dynamics. External timing produces structural collapse. Structural collapse produces withdrawal from functionalist orders. Yet this withdrawal does not lead merely to passivity or emptiness, but to emergent reorganization along intrinsic structural bindings. Out of these reorganizational processes arise new theory-productions, artistic forms, relational orders, or long-term investigations. These, in turn, collide again with institutional spaces of expectation, resulting in renewed misreading, delegitimization, or sanctioning.

What is decisive is the recurrence of the same underlying dynamic. What becomes visible is therefore not a linear pathology, but a recursive cycle of structural incompatibility. Conflict no longer appears as an exceptional disturbance within an otherwise stable system, but as a permanent generator of new operatoric condensation.

What is particularly striking is that sanctioning does not destroy productivity. It displaces it. Precisely where functional adaptation collapses, the cognition investigated here begins producing new forms of order. The loss of institutional compatibility generates not merely deficit, but often an intensification of emergent structure-production. Conflict itself thereby becomes, as already suggested, epistemic fuel.

The dynamic described here therefore resembles linear models of control far less than processes of natural form-production in which new order emerges precisely under conditions of stress, instability, or difference. Order no longer follows an external blueprint, but emerges from recursive reorganization within actual fields of tension.

This simultaneously explains why classical institutional models frequently misread the dynamic. What becomes visible there is primarily the loss of functional compatibility: withdrawal, escalation, overcomplexity, or refusal. What remains invisible, however, is

that highly complex reorganizational processes are often occurring in parallel. Productivity therefore does not disappear. Rather, it withdraws from dominant forms of administrative legibility.

One could say that neurodivergence plays the ball indirectly through multiple invisible rebounds inaccessible to normative cognition in an attempt to stabilize its own existence. At the same time, this forces it to remain within the in-between space of normative systems — within movement itself, within the next difference.

The more strongly institutional systems attempt to enforce functional adaptation, the more strongly the cognition described here reorganizes itself outside those systems. Sanctioning therefore often intensifies precisely the decoupling it attempts to prevent. The normative system continuously reproduces its own incompatibility. The attempt at functional stabilization paradoxically generates new spaces of difference within which emergent reorganization begins again.

The dynamic visible here therefore resembles classical clinical models less than recursive processes within dynamical systems in which disturbance and reorganization remain inseparably coupled. Conflict no longer functions merely destructively, but simultaneously as structure-production. Emergent order arises precisely out of the ruptures of functional stabilization.

Within this perspective, it may in fact become more rational than previously assumed to understand the tension-field between art, innovation, and neurodivergence.

One of the central misreadings of neurodivergent cognition may lie precisely here. Dominant models interpret deviation primarily as deficit in relation to existing social order. The material described here instead suggests that certain forms of cognition actively produce difference and thereby make possible entirely new forms of structural coupling. Neurodivergence would then no longer appear primarily as disturbance within an existing system, but partially as a functional factor within open-ended ecological and societal processes of reorganization.

Under certain conditions, these dynamics may even be structurally related to other processes of form-production found within natural systems themselves.

The model therefore shifts fundamentally. At its centre no longer stands primarily the description of individual traits or symptoms, but rather a morphology of recursive incompatibility-dynamics between different forms of world-organization.

4. Simulation and World-Binding

The dynamics described so far point toward a deeper conflict between different forms of world-formation. The central distinction concerns not merely communication,

behaviour, or social norms, but the way order itself is generated, stabilized, and maintained.

The dominant social order increasingly operates through simulative stabilization. Simulation here does not mean conscious deception or complete unreality, but rather an operatoric process of displacement within which social reality becomes increasingly organized through stabilized systems of representation that partially replace or translate direct relational process-coupling into administratively legible formats. Roles, administrative categories, definitions of work, diagnoses, market values, or institutional identities no longer emerge primarily from concrete situated world-relations, but are reproduced, synchronized, and functionally stabilized within already prestructured representational spaces.

Simulation therefore does not signify the absence of reality, but a shift in primacy within the organization of social reality itself. Representational stabilization gains priority over open relational process-binding. Reality increasingly appears relevant only insofar as it remains legible, comparable, and reproducible within existing administrative, communicative, or market-based formats.

The cognition investigated here, by contrast, organizes itself more strongly through world-binding and emergent world-formation. Structure emerges not primarily through representation, but through irreversible relational coupling within enactment itself. Cognition, labour, perception, and identity remain interconnected and cannot be arbitrarily separated without damaging the underlying coherence. World no longer appears as a finished object to be represented, but as something that stabilizes emergently only through ongoing processual coupling.

The conflict therefore concerns not merely different opinions or communication styles. Different cognitive profiles partially couple themselves to different forms of stabilization, temporality, and reality-formation. This is precisely why many conflicts appear so irresolvable. What is often lacking is not merely better communication, but a shared operatoric space within which the same forms of reality can still be jointly inhabited.

This also clarifies why classical strategies of inclusion frequently reach their limits. If the underlying modes of world-formation are structured differently, no completely neutral space of translation any longer exists. The tensions described here therefore concern not only behaviour or language, but the way reality itself is perceived, stabilized, and socially organized.

The central distinction is therefore not simply:

- right or wrong,
- healthy or ill,
- employable or unemployable,

but rather:

- simulation-preserving stabilization

versus

- emergent world-binding.

The meaning of many social conflicts thereby shifts as well. Questions of labour, diagnosis, administration, or social integration no longer appear merely as organizational problems, but increasingly as expressions of different modes of reality-formation and world-organization.

The concept of simulation used here remains, for the moment, restricted to the institutional and cognitive conflict-dynamics surrounding eigenzeit-based world-binding. The broader societal and civilizational consequences of simulation-based stabilization are explored more extensively in the parallel research paper *Operatoric World-Binding and the Crisis of Stabilization*.

The distinction described here between simulative stabilization and emergent world-binding corresponds structurally to the conflicts the author identifies in his physical works between stabilized observational spaces and irreversible emergence. This is explicitly not intended as a direct equivalence between physics and psychology. What matters instead is that similar structural problems reappear across different scales: the tension between reversible stabilization and irreversible form-production, between controlled representation and emergent process-reality.

5. Institutional Asymmetry and the Structural Double-Empathy Problem

The problem described here cannot be reduced to individual misunderstanding. There are clear parallels to the so-called double-empathy problem — that is, the reciprocal misinterpretation between different cognitive profiles. However, the present dynamic extends further, because the involved sides do not operate on the same structural level.

Dominant majority cognition possesses institutional infrastructure, economic definitional power, diagnostic authority, administrative enforcement mechanisms, and social normalization. Its organizational form therefore no longer appears as a specific historical formation, but as seemingly neutral reality itself. Precisely therein lies the actual asymmetry. The dominant order does not need to continuously explain itself, because its categories already constitute the standard of what counts as rational, employable, socially competent, or psychologically healthy.

The cognition described here, by contrast, exists in a permanent position of translation. It must continuously establish connection to systems whose underlying logic it

simultaneously destabilizes structurally, while possessing almost no control over the conditions of this translation. The dominant side determines:

- which forms of labour count as real,
- which forms of communication appear appropriate,
- which forms of temporality are considered legitimate,
- which forms of knowledge remain scientifically legible,
- and which deviations are interpreted as illness, deficit, or refusal.

This produces an asymmetric conflict structure. The dominant order interprets its own organizational form as neutral, universal, and without alternative, while divergent operatoric structures necessarily appear dysfunctional. Many of the processes described here therefore become legible not as autonomous forms of world-binding, but primarily as failures of functional adaptation.

The actual problem therefore lies not merely in insufficient mutual understanding. It lies in the structural incapacity of existing institutions to recognize certain forms of *eigenzeit*-based world-binding as real labour, knowledge, or social contribution at all. What becomes visible above all are the consequences of incompatibility — conflict, withdrawal, dysregulation, or escalation — while the underlying operatoric dynamic remains invisible.

This is precisely what produces chronic misreadings, institutional escalation, epistemic invisibility, economic destruction, and recursive conflict loops. The affected cognition is repeatedly forced to render itself legible within categories incapable of grasping its actual organizational form. The misreading thereby reproduces itself recursively.

If the model developed here is even partially correct, then the issue concerns not isolated cases or communicative misunderstandings, but a systemic problem of modern societies themselves. These societies are optimized for particular operatoric profiles — for functional compatibility, standardized temporality, modular productivity, and socially compatible forms of self-organization. Cognitive forms operating more strongly through emergent condensation, *eigenzeit*, and irreversible process-binding almost inevitably generate exclusion, decoupling, and structural violence within such systems.

At the same time, precisely here there may exist a previously underestimated potential. The very same dynamics that appear dysfunctional under highly standardized conditions often demonstrate unusual capacities for reorganization under conditions of heightened complexity, instability, and open-ended problem spaces. The cognition investigated here responds to conflict not primarily through restoration of existing order, but through emergent reconfiguration of relational structures. And it does so through intensified relational sensitivity — not necessarily toward normative cognition itself, but toward the suppressed, displaced, or structurally obscured patterns beneath or beside it. This is precisely why the same processes institutionally interpreted as failure often generate new

theoretical forms, alternative labour models, unexpected relational configurations, or forms of world-binding that initially remain unreadable within dominant systems.

This conflict becomes especially visible, for example, in the discrepancy between the recognized cultural value of artistic labour and the material precarity of those who produce it. Maximal openness and experimental necessity collide with demands for predictability and reproducible value categories.

The societal relevance of neurodivergent existence thereby shifts as well. The question no longer concerns merely minority protection, diagnosis, or clinical classification, but potentially the future capacity of complex societies to respond to crisis, ambiguity, and irreversible processes of transformation — that is, the preservation of systemic immunity against rigidity and the closure of alternatives.

Highly stabilized systems frequently reach their limits precisely where existing categories collapse and new relational orders must first emerge. The profile investigated here suggests that those forms of cognition appearing dysfunctional within functionalist stabilization may possess unusual capacities for reorganization under conditions of societal instability.

The author's broader body of work further demonstrates that the observed productivity does not operate in isolation from reality or merely generate subjective interior worlds. The resulting works, models, and investigations continuously recouple themselves to real problem-fields of social organization. The structure-production described here does not follow arbitrary fantasy, but coherent operatoric logics intended to render real tensions workable and therefore livable at all.

In this sense, the dynamic described here resembles processes within an ecosystem more than classical deficit-models of psychological dysfunction. The cognition responds to disturbance not primarily through withdrawal from reality, but through continuous reorganization of relation, structure, and world-binding. Precisely for this reason, it appears paradoxical from a functionalist perspective: institutionally dysfunctional and simultaneously highly structure-productive.

Similar asymmetric dynamics have already been described within neurodivergent epistemology, disability studies, and theories of epistemic injustice. Damian Milton argues within the Double Empathy framework that social misreadings do not emerge one-sidedly, but from incompatible forms of social world-organization. Miranda Fricker, in turn, describes through the concept of epistemic injustice how certain subjects are structurally prevented from becoming legible at all as credible carriers of knowledge.

6. Boundary Questions of Operatoric World-Binding

The dynamics described here inevitably raise epistemic boundary questions. Once subjective structure-production is no longer described merely as an individual interior perspective, but as a possible form of real world-coupling, the question immediately arises of how to distinguish it from psychosis, grandiosity, apophenia, or mere introspection.

These questions are not secondary. On the contrary. Precisely because the perspective developed here partially destabilizes existing categories of labour, knowledge, reality, and social order, it must also reflect upon its own risks. Otherwise, it would itself risk collapsing into closed self-confirmation or ontological totalization.

The decisive distinction does not lie simply between “real” and “unreal.” Such an opposition would already presuppose a simplified objectivist model grounded in a supposedly neutral external perspective. The operatoric dynamic described here instead organizes itself through relational coupling, recursive self-testing, and continuous reorganization under real conditions.

Precisely therein lies a fundamental difference from psychotic or ideologically closed dynamics. Such systems increasingly stabilize particular patterns self-referentially. Individual meanings, relations, or placements become ontologically fixed and shielded from further recalibration. The system begins to confirm itself. New information becomes integrated only insofar as it reinforces already existing patterns. It is precisely in this way that closed simulation spaces emerge.

The operatoric described here functions differently. Stability does not reside in the preservation of individual patterns. What remains stable instead is the capacity for continuous reorganization of relational coupling itself. The operator constantly produces patterns, yet never fully identifies with them. New placements, displacements, and recalibrations emerge continuously, precisely in order to prevent rigid closure.

For this reason, the perspective developed here remains fundamentally empirically open. Its viability is not determined through subjective conviction, but through the question of whether the same recursive dynamics can in fact be observed repeatedly under differing conditions. The aim is therefore not to formulate an irrefutable theory, but to render visible recurring structural invariances that future research may investigate more precisely.

What survives through the operator are not fixed contents or absolute truths, but operatoric mobility itself. Within this process, patterns do not appear as final laws or ontological totalities, but as temporary condensations within open recursion. They may be reorganized, displaced, or dissolved again once new relational tensions become visible.

This is precisely what fundamentally distinguishes the dynamic described here from classical apophenia or pattern over-recognition. Pattern over-recognition often emerges where temporary coherences become ontologically fixed. The operator described here continuously destabilizes such closures anew. Its stability lies not in the pattern itself, but in the capacity to continuously re-pattern reality.

This also means that the cognition described here does not strive toward a closed totality. Emergent structure-production does not organize itself through universal mastery or complete explanation of the world. It more closely resembles what Jakob von Uexküll described as *Umwelt*: a relational embeddedness within specific coupling-spaces inside which meaning emerges relationally. Structure therefore remains locally bound, even where it generates highly complex relations.

Precisely for this reason, it often appears as grandiosity from more objectivist or functionalist cognitive positions. Dominant systems frequently interpret strong structure-production automatically as an implicit totalizing claim, because their own organizational forms themselves operate through universalizing categories. Administration, market logic, diagnosis, or objectivist science likewise generate large-scale orders, while rarely perceiving their own ontological placements as specific forms of world-binding rather than neutral reality itself.

The operatoric described here functions otherwise. It does not claim an absolute external standpoint. Its coherence does not emerge through distance from the world, but through continuous relational coupling within real processes. Precisely for this reason, external reality remains structurally operative. Conflict, resistance, crisis, or institutional counterreaction are not excluded, but continuously reorganize the process itself.

This also marks the decisive distinction from mere extreme introspection. The material described here does not demonstrate withdrawal from reality into private interior worlds. On the contrary, it demonstrates an intensified coupling to real structural problems of social organization. The conflicts surrounding labour, poverty, administration, science, or institutional order are not imaginary. Their consequences are material, social, and documentable. The resulting theory-productions, books, films, and investigations generate real feedback effects within the field itself.

The question is therefore no longer simply whether subjective experience is “objectively true,” but rather in what way particular forms of subjective organization may absorb, condense, and reorganize real structural tensions.

For this reason, the model developed here necessarily remains open. It does not claim to provide a final theory of cognition or reality, but understands itself as an investigation of recursive invariances under conditions of ongoing operatoric reorganization. Within this model, truth no longer appears as rigid representation, but as temporarily viable coherence within open world-coupling and world-formation.

The actual stability therefore lies neither in the pattern nor in a final theory, but in the ongoing recursive enactment of operatoric movement itself.

Interestingly, more recent models of psychotic dynamics likewise describe processes of disturbed recalibration, aberrant salience, or increasing self-stabilization of particular patterns. The operatoric described here differs precisely in that it does not strive toward the final stabilization of individual patterns. What remains stable instead is the ongoing capacity for recalibration itself.

7. Concluding Remarks: Subjectivity as an Operatoric Form of Resonance

The observations described here do not imply that subjective experience directly mirrors objective reality or that individual perception automatically produces ontological truth. Such an equation would itself collapse back into simplified and ultimately untenable models. The present text therefore does not claim that interior subjective perspective, as such, already guarantees knowledge. What matters instead is the recurring structural coherence of particular operatoric patterns across entirely different levels of organization.

The same dynamics repeatedly reappear — in perception, labour, temporality, crisis trajectories, institutional conflict, emergent theory-production, and even in structural models of irreversible form-production explored elsewhere within the broader body of work. It is precisely this recurrence under variation that becomes epistemically relevant. The described processes thereby no longer appear merely as individual interior perspective or psychological peculiarity, but as possible indications of real organizational forms reproducing themselves across different scales.

The question therefore shifts fundamentally. No longer merely:

“How does a subject experience the world?”

but increasingly:

“In what way may certain forms of subjective organization themselves participate in real processes of world-formation?”

The role of subjectivity changes accordingly. It no longer appears merely as private interiority or as distortion of objective reality, but potentially as an operatoric form of resonance within complex processes of world-formation. Certain cognitive forms may experience particular tensions with unusual intensity precisely because their organization is more strongly coupled to real structural conflicts. Subjective experience would then no longer appear simply as illusion or pure representation, but as part of a relational process within which world itself becomes stabilized, reorganized, or transformed.

This explicitly does not mean that all observed patterns are universally valid or that they already constitute a complete model. The present material instead understands itself as an open investigation, a process of condensation, and a documentation of recursive invariances that existing models still appear unable to adequately describe. Many of the concepts developed here therefore initially possess heuristic character. Their purpose is to render tensions visible, not prematurely to deliver definitive explanations.

Precisely therein, however, may lie the actual significance of such boundary profiles. Not as mere deviations within already existing systems, but as epistemic condensation spaces within which the structural tensions of modern reality-organization become visible and experientially accessible in the first place. Highly stabilized societies tend to perceive their own organizational forms as neutral, self-evident, and without alternative. Only at the fracture-zones of incompatible world-bindings do the hidden presuppositions of such systems begin to emerge.

The cognition described here therefore no longer appears simply as deficit within an otherwise coherent order, but as a form of operatoric sensitivity toward tensions that remain largely invisible within dominant stabilization systems. Precisely for this reason, it so frequently generates conflict — not necessarily because it is destructive, but because it renders visible processes that established orders can maintain only through continuous reduction, standardization, and simulative stabilization.

The actual epistemic potential of such profiles may therefore lie less in their deviation itself than in their capacity to render visible the structural limits of existing models. Not despite their instability, but precisely through the way they respond to incompatibility, crisis, and irreversible transformation.

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Operatoric World-Binding and the Crisis of Stabilization - Neurodivergence, Emergence, and the Limits of Simulation-Based Society

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between emergent world-formation, irreversible Eigenzeit, and the increasing stabilization dynamics of modern societies. Building on earlier work on process cognition, operatoric world-binding, and the structural incompatibility between emergent and functional modes of organization, the paper develops a perspective in which reality is not understood primarily through stable representation, stored information, or functional reproducibility, but through irreversible processes of relational condensation under conditions of open difference.

At the center of the investigation lies the observation that modern societies increasingly translate reality into administratively legible, simulation-based, and statistically reproducible orders. Processes are expected to remain controllable before they can fully unfold. Conflicts are functionally neutralized, difference is reduced, and world is increasingly organized within stabilized informational environments. The paper argues that precisely through these dynamics, those conditions necessary for real emergence, structural reorganization, and long-term world-capability come under increasing pressure.

Within this framework, Eigenzeit is understood not merely as subjective time experience, but as the temporal structure of irreversible world-binding itself. World-formation emerges not primarily from stable programs or stored forms, but through recursive processes of condensation, displacement, and metastable reorganization. Emergence therefore does not merely describe the appearance of new properties within already existing systems, but real condition-shift: every condensation irreversibly alters the possibilities of further condensation. The concepts of submergence, indimergence, and emergence, developed by the author in earlier works, do not describe linear developmental phases, but different operatoric aspects of irreversible form-formation.

Drawing on long-term autoethnographic research within labor systems, institutional conflicts, artistic research, and recursive theory production, the investigation identifies recurring operatoric invariants that reproduce themselves across different levels of societal reality organization. What becomes visible are conflicts between emergent forms of world-binding and highly stabilized institutional orders that remain primarily dependent on functional legibility, representation, and reversible control.

Within this context, neurodivergent or eigenzeit-bound forms of cognition appear not merely as individual deviations, but potentially as historical contact zones in which suppressed conditions of real emergence become visible again. The paper explicitly argues neither for a romanticization of neurodivergence nor for a universal theory of cognition. Its aim is instead the mapping of recursive relational patterns that may point toward deeper tensions within modern forms of reality organization.

The paper concludes that the growing conflict between irreversible world-formation and simulation-based stabilization may point toward a broader civilizational crisis: the increasing difficulty of modern societies to continue integrating real difference, open emergence, and long-term world-capability.

Keywords: neurodivergence, autism, ADHD, AuDHD, eigenzeit, world-binding, world-capability, operatoric cognition, emergent world-formation, irreversible emergence, metastability, structural incompatibility, simulation-based society, stabilization, recursive world-building, process cognition, relational condensation, indimergence, submergence, emergence, neurodivergent epistemology, enactivism, morphogenesis, irreversibility, relational ontology, systems theory, epistemic violence, institutional conflict, functional inoperability, simulation, administrative stabilization, crisis of world-binding, emergent knowledge formation, structural tension, world-capability, operatoric invariance, recursive condensation, post-representational cognition, irreducible difference, complexity, functional reduction, generative ontology

1. Introduction

Modern societies increasingly organize reality through stabilization, representation, and functional legibility. Processes are expected to remain administratively manageable, reproducible, and as reversible as possible. Labor is defined through measurable function, knowledge through propositional validation, and social integration through the ability to participate reliably within standardized institutional orders. At the same time, however, zones of conflict increasingly emerge in which precisely those forms of cognition, labor, and world-relation come under pressure that operate closer to open emergence, irreversible condensation, and relational dynamics that cannot be fully stabilized.

In contrast to resonance theories such as those developed by Hartmut Rosa, the present perspective focuses less on the quality of successful world-relations within existing social orders than on the operatoric conditions of irreversible world-formation itself. The decisive question here is not primarily how resonance within social relations becomes possible, but how emergent form-formation can remain possible under conditions of structural displacement. From this perspective, the problem of modern stabilization

societies appears not primarily as a loss of resonant relation to the world, but more fundamentally as a progressive reduction of those open spaces of difference within which real emergence, irreversible reorganization, and new world-formation can arise at all.

The present investigation builds upon earlier work on Eigenzeit, emergent world-formation, operatoric cognition, and the structural incompatibility between eigenzeit-bound world-binding and functional stabilization systems, particularly the papers *Operatoric Eigenzeit Profiles*, *Thinking in Formation*, *Work under Eigenzeit*, as well as the book *They Cannot Understand*. While these earlier works focused primarily on epistemological, labor-related, and institutional conflicts surrounding emergent forms of cognition, the focus here shifts more strongly toward the underlying dynamics of societal reality organization itself.

At the center of the investigation lies the observation that certain forms of cognition do not operate primarily through stable representation, functional reduction, or symbolic order, but through recursive processes of relational condensation under conditions of open difference. Within dominant institutional systems, the resulting conflicts often appear as dysfunction, inoperability, or excessive complexity. At the same time, however, it becomes visible that precisely these same dynamics frequently generate new forms of world-relation, emergent theory production, and relational reorganization under conditions of structural crisis.

The investigation follows the hypothesis that modern stabilization societies increasingly tend to organize reality within reproducible informational environments, statistical comparability, and administrative control logics. As a consequence, precisely those conditions necessary for real emergence, irreversible transformation, and long-term world-capability may gradually come under pressure. The integration of algorithmic governance, simulation-based administrative processes, and generative AI systems further intensifies this tendency, as relational openness is increasingly reduced in favor of functional predictability.

The following chapters therefore attempt to analyze these developments not primarily in psychological or diagnostic terms, but as expressions of a deeper operatoric conflict between different forms of societal reality organization. At the center lies the question of whether certain neurodivergent or eigenzeit-bound threshold profiles should be understood less as isolated individual deviations than as contact zones to suppressed conditions of real world-formation that increasingly become invisible within highly stabilized societies.

1.1 Operatoric Core Concepts

The following concepts are not used within this investigation as closed definitions in the sense of stable categories, but rather as operatoric markers within an ongoing process of condensation. They do not designate isolated objects, but recurring dynamics that reproduce themselves across different levels under changing conditions.

World-binding refers to those processes through which relational order is not merely perceived, but practically, cognitively, affectively, socially, and materially co-produced. Within this perspective, world does not appear as a fully given external order, but as an ongoing relation that is continuously bound, stabilized, and simultaneously displaced.

Eigenzeit refers not merely to subjective time experience, but to the temporal structure of irreversible world-binding itself. It emerges wherever real coupling alters the conditions of further coupling. In this sense, time is not merely the framework within which processes occur, but an expression of displacement of conditions within concrete processes of form-formation.

Emergence, within this investigation, does not merely designate the appearance of new properties arising from complex interaction. Rather, it refers to an irreversible displacement of the conditions of further world-formation. An emergent formation does not simply add something to an already existing system, but transforms the space of possibility within which further formations can emerge.

Stabilization refers to the temporary condensation of relational order. Stabilization is necessary for world-formation, but becomes problematic when it attempts to close openness completely. Simulation, by contrast, designates those forms of stabilization in which representation, comparability, and reproducibility take the place of real condition-shift. Simulation can render order highly legible without necessarily generating new world-binding.

These concepts therefore do not serve the construction of a closed theoretical system, but rather the description of a constitutive tension: world-formation requires stabilization, yet loses its capacity for emergence when stabilization collapses into closure, reproduction, and simulation.

2. Operatoric Tension Fields of Modern World Organization

The following tension fields do not describe clearly separated human types or stable ontological categories. Rather, they indicate different tendencies of societal reality organization that intersect in shifting constellations within modern stabilization societies. The distinction therefore does not serve the typologization of persons, but the clarification of different operatoric modes of world-binding.

Within stabilizing systems, knowledge predominantly appears as explicit, propositional, and administratively securable information. Cognition is expected to remain pre-validated, reproducibly organized, and functionally legible wherever possible. Theory within such orders preferentially stabilizes already existing models and reduces open difference in favor of controllable comparability.

Emergent or eigenzeit-bound forms of world-binding, by contrast, frequently operate less through stable representation than through recursive processes of relational condensation. Cognition here emerges not primarily through linear deduction within already stabilized order, but through operatoric condensation under conditions of ongoing displacement. Clarity therefore often emerges retrospectively. Repetition does not reproduce identity, but alters the conditions of further world-formation themselves.

A similar tension becomes visible in relation to time. Within functional stabilization, time appears predominantly as a neutral framework within which processes can be planned, synchronized, and administratively coordinated. Action, evaluation, and cognition remain largely separated from one another. Crises appear primarily as disturbances of already existing order.

Eigenzeit-bound processes, by contrast, operate closer to internal condensation and irreversible displacement of conditions. Action and cognition remain more tightly coupled. Repetition does not simply confirm existing order, but continuously reorganizes relational conditions. Crisis therefore appears not exclusively as destructive, but under certain conditions can itself become reorganizational.

These tensions also emerge clearly in relation to labor. Modern functional systems define labor primarily through measurability, constant productivity, and short-term utility. Non-fit within such systems generally appears as dysfunction or failure of integration.

Emergent forms of labor, by contrast, often operate less through constant reproduction than through phases of intensive condensation, reorganizational crisis, and long-term form-formation. Productivity within such processes appears not primarily quantitative, but relational. Precisely under conditions of structural non-fit, new theory formations, relational recouplings, or cultural condensations may emerge that initially remain invisible within functional models of labor.

The deepest tension ultimately concerns the status of reality itself. Stabilization systems tend to organize world within administratively legible, reproducible, and maximally reversible orders. Difference thereby frequently appears primarily as a risk to functional stability. Conflicts are expected to be reduced, processes kept controllable, and emergent openness transferred into stable representation as early as possible.

Eigenzeit-bound world-binding, by contrast, operates closer to irreversible emergence. World does not appear here as a fully given order, but as an ongoing process of relational world-formation under conditions of open difference. Within this perspective, conflicts do not merely mark disturbances of already existing systems, but may themselves assume

morphogenetic functions. Every condensation generates new condition-shift, and every stabilization alters the possibilities of further emergence.

The following chapters therefore investigate the resulting conflict dynamics not as mere differences of individual perception, but as expressions of deeper tensions between different modes of societal reality organization.

3. Conflict Cycles and Recursive World-Formation

The previously described tension fields remain abstract as long as they are not examined under conditions of real structural collision. Particularly within highly stabilized societies, emergent forms of world-binding often become visible precisely where they encounter institutional orders organized primarily through representation, functional legibility, and administrative stabilization.

This becomes especially visible within systems of cultural production. Art funding frequently stages art as a competition of excellence with clearly formulable outcomes, controllable project architectures, and relatively stable expectations of success. Real creative processes, however, often unfold in far more open, contradictory, and emergent ways. Funding structures demand statements in advance about results that, within real processes of condensation, may only emerge during the process itself. It is precisely here that fractures emerge between stabilizing fantasies of formatting and living processes that resist such prior synchronization.

Similar tensions become visible within administrative systems. Administration operates predominantly through stable categories, temporal synchronization, functional comparability, and linear responsibilities. Actually lived forms of existence, however, frequently unfold in far more unstable, circular, and contradictory ways. Neurodivergent or precarious forms of life therefore repeatedly collide with institutional models of fit because their dynamics operate less through constant reproduction than through recursive condensation, relational reorganization, and irreversible displacement of conditions.

Conflicts within such systems therefore appear not merely as individual maladjustment, but increasingly as expressions of deeper incompatibilities between different modes of societal reality organization.

In areas such as:

- labor,
- administration,
- diagnostics,
- institutional integration,

- education,
- science,
- and functional adaptation,

modern systems operate predominantly through:

- standardization,
- temporal synchronization,
- administrative comparability,
- and stable forms of social reproducibility.

Emergent or eigenzeit-bound processes frequently come into conflict with such orders.

Within eigenzeit-bound conditions, processes emerge naturally that are subsequently misread as disturbances. Necessary intermediate phases involving detours, crises, errors, non-fit, or temporary inoperability are prematurely interrupted under systemic pressure. Precisely through this mechanism, necessary indirect processes operating through difference and diversity are suppressed in advance. Neurodivergent people are thereby frequently forced into inclusion frameworks that fail to understand the actual point of fracture. Non-fit then appears merely as an individual problem instead of as a possible structural requirement necessary to preserve internal order on both sides.

As a result, constellations emerge that often appear paradoxical within functional systems. Precisely where stable integration, linear adaptation, or continuous reproducibility are expected, emergent processes may collapse or generate operative inoperability. At the same time, however, it is often precisely under such crisis conditions that new theory formations, relational recouplings, cultural condensations, or reorganized forms of world-binding emerge.

This becomes particularly visible within labor and welfare systems. Many job centers operate implicitly according to models of short-term reproducible functionality. Generosity within such systems frequently appears as risk or loss of control. Yet it is precisely such openness that often forms the precondition for emergent reorganization to occur at all. One can observe how systems do not merely administer poverty, but actively intensify it by suppressing precisely those spaces of movement that would make long-term condensation possible in the first place. The necessary turning radius is systematically underestimated, so to speak.

Expectations appropriate to a bicycle are imposed upon existences structured more like a truck, after which the systemically produced non-fit is declared an individual deficit.

Similar tensions can be found within scientific systems. Science frequently assumes that quality can be secured through third-party funding structures, excellence regimes, and project-based governance. At the same time, however, it often devalues precisely those forms of knowledge that emerge beyond short-term budgetary and utility logics. Real

theoretical condensation frequently follows not linear project cycles, but far more unstable processes of long-term recursive reorganization.

Productivity therefore does not simply disappear within such dynamics. Rather, it reorganizes itself according to different operatoric conditions, yet is frequently excluded from dominant regimes of value attribution. Precisely here lies one of the central tensions of modern stabilization societies. Systems that define productivity primarily through functional legibility and administrative reproducibility often fail to recognize emergent forms of world-formation, even though it is precisely these that may generate new epistemic, cultural, or societal possibilities over the long term.

Similar dynamics also become visible within urban spaces. Art and culture frequently generate long-term relational condensation and new forms of social world-binding. Processes of gentrification subsequently translate these same dynamics into short-term economic utility. Tension fields thereby emerge in which precisely those open cultural processes that produced the original transformation are displaced.

These conflicts intensify further because emergent structural production frequently appears within stabilizing systems not as constructive world-relation, but as excessive complexity, irritation, or a threat to administrative order. Attempts to reorganize conflicts productively or generate new relational models therefore often trigger further reactions of reduction and stabilization. Recursive conflict cycles thereby emerge in which structural non-fit continuously produces new condensation.

The dynamic can therefore be described less as a linear process of adaptation than as a recursive morphology of emergent world-formation:

Collision with functional order
↓
Breakdown of stable compatibility
↓
Withdrawal from administrative reproducibility
↓
Relational reorganization and condensation
↓
Production of new structural formations
↓
Renewed attempt at coupling
↓
New structural non-fit

What is decisive here is that this dynamic cannot be reduced to isolated psychological, cultural, or ethnic characteristics. Similar patterns reproduce themselves across highly different levels:

- labor,

- institutional conflicts,
- emergent knowledge production,
- social relations,
- temporal organization,
- cultural reorganization,
- migration,
- environmental destruction,
- as well as processes of economic and technological transformation.

Precisely this universality under variation suggests that what becomes visible here may not merely be individual peculiarities, but deeper tensions between emergent forms of world-formation and highly stabilized societal orders.

It is also remarkable that the resulting conflicts do not remain exclusively destructive. Within such processes, crises generate not merely loss, but often new innovative forms of binding. Breakdowns do not lead only toward dissolution, but frequently toward reorganization under irreversibly altered conditions. Instability therefore no longer appears merely as a disturbance of existing order, but itself becomes an operator of emergent form-formation.

This also shifts the meaning of concepts such as work-capacity, integration, or functionality. The problem may lie less in a lack of productivity than in the fact that modern societies can predominantly recognize productivity only within stabilized and administratively legible forms. Processes of emergent world-formation therefore frequently remain invisible, even though it may be precisely these that open new possibilities of societal transformation over the long term.

Perhaps one of the central conflicts of modern stabilization societies lies precisely here: that they simultaneously depend upon and systematically destabilize those forms of cognition, labor, and world-binding that operate closer to open emergence.

The previously described conflict dynamics therefore appear within this perspective not merely as social or institutional problems. They point instead toward deeper questions concerning world-organization itself. If emergent processes repeatedly collide with stabilizing systems, then this concerns not only labor, administration, or social integration, but potentially already the ontological conditions of time, form-formation, and reality themselves. It is precisely at this point that the concept of *Eigenzeit* becomes central.

4. Eigenzeit as an Irreversible Curvature Process

Dominant models of cognition, life, and form-formation usually rest implicitly on the assumption that order emerges primarily from information, representation, or stored structures. Within such perspectives, form appears predominantly as the execution of already existing rules within a neutrally conceived temporal framework. Time itself remains external, homogeneous, and largely organized as reversible. Processes unfold within stable conditions without fundamentally altering the conditions of their own repeatability.

The conflict dynamics described previously, however, point toward a different form of process organization. Emergent world-formation appears here to operate not primarily through the reproduction of stable order, but through irreversible condensation within open states of difference. It is precisely in this context that the concept of Eigenzeit becomes relevant.

See in particular the papers *Operatoric Eigenzeit Profiles*, *Thinking in Formation*, and *Work under Eigenzeit*.

Within the perspective developed here, Eigenzeit does not merely designate subjective time experience. Rather, the concept refers to the temporal structure of irreversible world-binding itself. It emerges wherever real relational coupling cannot be fully stabilized and every condensation simultaneously alters the conditions of further condensation. World thereby reorganizes itself not identically, but along ongoing displacements of being under irreversibly transformed conditions.

This fundamentally shifts the relation between time and form. Not:

“Time exists and form emerges within it,”

but rather:

“Irreversible condensation generates Eigenzeit, within which form can emerge in the first place.”

Within this perspective, time therefore no longer appears merely as a neutral container of processes, but increasingly as the expression of real restructuring of conditions. Recurrence does not simply reproduce identity, but reorganizes relational constellations under altered conditions. Every stabilization alters the possibilities of further stabilization. Every emergent form already carries within itself the displacement of its own conditions.

The concept of emergence employed here therefore differs fundamentally from many classical models of emergence. Emergence does not merely designate the appearance of new properties within otherwise stable systems, nor simply higher complexity arising from the interaction of simpler elements. What is decisive is rather that emergence itself irreversibly alters the conditions of further emergence. World therefore does not

reorganize itself within stable ontological frameworks, but continuously displaces the conditions of its own possibility. Emergence thus appears not as a secondary effect of an already existing system, but as real condition-shift within open world-formation itself.

In contrast to teleodynamic models of emergence such as those proposed by Deacon (2011), the focus here lies less on self-organizing purposiveness within dynamic systems than on irreversible displacement of conditions and open world-formation.

The resulting difference generates a gap or structural non-fit that cannot be fully closed. Precisely from this emerges the ongoing displacement of relational order. Emergence within this perspective therefore does not appear as the mere addition of new properties to an already stable system. What is decisive instead is that every emergent condensation alters the conditions of further condensation and thereby generates new openness within difference itself. Form-formation therefore does not occur within fully closable order, but within permanent condition-shift. In this context, emergence signifies less a “more” within stable structure than the irreversible curvature of the conditions under which further structure can emerge at all.

The concept of emergence developed here therefore does not describe arbitrary openness or abstract indeterminacy. The displacement emerges instead from real relational condensation itself. Precisely through this, emergence acquires within this perspective a concrete morphogenetic significance for processes of world- and form-formation.

Life therefore appears less as the execution of fully stored order than as a metastable balance between stabilization and open emergence. Excessive stabilization tends toward closure, functional rigidity, and simulative reproduction. Excessive openness, by contrast, may dissolve into disintegration. Form-formation appears to emerge precisely within the tension field between these two movements.

The concepts of submergence, indimergence, and emergence, as developed within the present framework and throughout the author’s broader work, do not describe linear developmental phases or temporally successive states. Rather, they designate different operatoric aspects of irreversible world-formation. What is decisive here is that indimergence in particular must not be misunderstood as a transitional process.

Submergence designates the openness of not-yet-stabilized possibility. It refers to that not fully bound potentiality within which relational form-formation has not yet undergone irreversible condensation. Submergence alone therefore does not generate stable world-relation, but remains open possibility without durable binding.

Emergence, by contrast, designates the temporary condensation and stabilization of world-capable relations. Within this model, emergence does not merely mean the appearance of new properties within already existing systems, but the concrete formation of relationally bound world-structure under irreversibly altered conditions.

Indimergence, however, designates neither a transition between submergence and emergence nor a mediating intermediate state. Rather, the concept refers to that not fully

objectifiable condition-shift within which world-formation becomes possible in the first place. Indimergence therefore describes not a process within the world, but the irreversible curvature of the conditions under which form, difference, and relational binding can emerge.

Precisely for this reason, indimergence must not be read as a temporal mediation between openness and stabilization. The frequent question of “how” submergence and emergence are connected already returns, within this perspective, to a problematic process model. Indimergence does not designate a mediating dynamic, but the not fully closable difference within which world-formation can acquire reality at all.

Form therefore emerges neither from complete separation nor from complete fusion. Every relational order requires both stabilization and openness simultaneously. It is precisely from this impossibility of closure that the metastable tension emerges within which world, time, and form can arise together.

5. From the Functional Cycle to Emergent World-Formation

Jakob von Uexküll’s functional cycles marked a decisive break with objectivist models of world (Uexküll, 1934) by demonstrating that organisms do not operate within a neutral external reality, but within relational environments co-produced through perception and action. Within this perspective, perception, meaning, and action form recursive couplings between organism and environment. World therefore no longer appears as an objective space of independent things, but as a relational structure of operative binding.

The perspective developed here, however, attempts to shift this idea further. While Uexküll’s functional cycles, despite their radicality, remain predominantly organized within relatively stable environmental couplings, the present model describes world-formation more strongly under conditions of irreversible displacement. The decisive dynamic lies here not primarily in the reproduction of functional equilibria, but increasingly in the fact that real coupling itself alters the conditions of further coupling.

Within this perspective, every condensation generates new relational curvature. Every stabilization produces new difference. Recurrence therefore no longer appears as a closed cycle of identical reproduction, but as ongoing reorganization under altered conditions. World does not simply reproduce itself identically, but reorganizes itself along the displacements of its own possibilities generated through binding.

The dynamics of emergent world-formation can therefore be described less as a functional circular movement than as a recursive drift of relational condensation:

Coupling

↓

Condensation

↓

Collision
↓
Loss of existing possibility
↓
Reorganization under altered conditions
↓
Temporary stabilization
↓
Renewed displacement

What is decisive here is that displacement does not intervene only retrospectively upon an otherwise stable process. Rather, it already constitutes the condition of formation itself. Within this perspective, world does not emerge simply within neutral time and neutral space, but through irreversible restructuring of conditions. It is precisely from this that *Eigenzeit* emerges as the temporal signature of real world-binding.

Conflict therefore no longer appears merely as a disturbance of functional order, but increasingly as an expression of morphogenetic tension. Precisely where stable environmental couplings become destabilized — for example under conditions of structural non-fit, institutional over-condensation, or functional inoperability — the limits of existing world-orders become visible. Within this context, emergence therefore does not designate the linear production of new forms from old states, but the temporary stabilization of new relational conditions under irreversibly altered possibilities.

The focus thereby shifts from the reproduction of an environment toward the emergence of world itself. World no longer appears primarily as a stable resonant space, but as a recursive process of ongoing recoupling under conditions of not fully closable openness.

The very notion of reality shifts fundamentally through the understanding of *Eigenzeit*. Within this perspective, realities no longer appear as stable things or closed boxes situated within a neutral space-time framework. Rather, they form themselves as displacements, curvatures, and relational condensations that continuously reorganize their own conditions.

Existence thereby always also means displacement of possibility. Every emergent formation distorts the framework of further formation itself. Precisely for this reason, emergent world-formation cannot simply be reintegrated into a fully closed totality. With every real condensation, the relational framework becomes distorted once again. World therefore remains irreversibly open.

Within this context, *Eigenzeit* does not merely designate process duration, but rather that irreversibility bound to real world-binding within which openness, stabilization, and emergent reorganization can coexist at all. Without this ongoing displacement,

world-formation would collapse into the mere repetition of already stabilized order — into feedback machinery of reproduction.

Precisely here lies a major difference from many information-based, cybernetic, or simulation-oriented models of life and cognition. Within the perspective developed here, order does not emerge primarily from stored programs, fixed representations, or external blueprints. Form-formation instead emerges through irreversible condensation within open states of difference. Stabilization therefore always remains temporary. Every emergent form already carries within itself the displacement of its own conditions.

Life therefore appears within this model less as the pure reproduction of existing order than as a metastable balance between stabilization and open emergence. Excessive stabilization tends toward closure, functional rigidity, and simulative reproduction. Excessive openness, by contrast, may dissolve into disintegration and the loss of stabilizable form. Within this model, emergence arises precisely within the tension field between these two movements.

This ultimately also shifts the status of crisis, conflict, and non-fit fundamentally. They no longer appear merely as errors within an otherwise stable system, but as zones within which the limits of existing world-orders become visible and new relational possibilities may emerge. Precisely under conditions of structural collision, it becomes visible that world is not simply given, but continuously produced within irreversible processes of displacement.

The perspective developed here shares with irreversible process models such as those of Prigogine (1997) the assumption that real form-formation cannot be understood within fully reversible order.

6. Metastable World-Capability

The dynamics described thus far must not be misunderstood as a simple opposition between stabilization and openness. The perspective developed here argues neither for permanent destabilization nor for the dissolution of all order into infinite openness. A completely open world would dissolve into disintegration just as a completely stabilized world would collapse into functional rigidity and simulative reproduction.

What appears decisive instead is the capacity of a system to generate new relational order under conditions of irreversible displacement without either collapsing completely or administratively closing all openness. It is precisely here that the concept of metastable world-capability becomes relevant.

Within this perspective, world-capability therefore does not designate the ability to achieve perfect stabilization, but rather the ability to integrate structural displacement without destroying the conditions of further emergence. Real form-formation thereby

remains fundamentally organized through tension. Order emerges not despite difference, but within an ongoing balance between stabilization and open displacement.

The conception of metastable form-formation employed here resonates in part with Simondon's theory of individuation (Simondon, 1992), while extending it more strongly toward societal world-organization and irreversible emergence.

This also transforms the status of crisis, conflict, and instability. They no longer appear merely as errors within otherwise functioning systems, but as possible moments of necessary reorganization. At the same time, however, this does not mean that every destabilization automatically becomes productive. Systems may equally collapse into overcomplexity, irreversible dissolution, or the loss of coherent world-binding.

Emergence therefore remains dependent upon the capacity for temporary recondensation. It is precisely for this reason that *Eigenzeit* acquires such significance.

Metastable world-capability designates precisely this balance:

- openness without complete dissolution,
- stabilization without complete closure,
- condensation without rigidity,
- and reorganization without loss of world-binding.

Within this perspective, life therefore appears neither as a purely chaotic process nor as fully programmed order. Rather, it moves within permanent tensions between:

- emergence and stabilization,
- openness and form,
- displacement and temporary coherence,
- as well as irreversible difference and relational recondensation.

Modern stabilization societies, however, increasingly tend to shift this metastable balance in favor of administrative reproducibility, functional comparability, and simulative control. World-capability thereby frequently becomes confused with controllability. Processes are expected to remain legible before they can fully unfold. Conflicts are to be neutralized before new relational order can emerge. Different forms of world-binding are prematurely translated into stable categories, diagnoses, administrative logics, or functional roles.

As a consequence, the long-term danger emerges that systems may increase their stability while simultaneously losing their capacity to integrate real structural displacement productively.

These dynamics do not remain confined to abstract system models. They increasingly become visible within concrete societal processes. Precisely where systems expand their

stabilization capacities, forms of relational loss, simplification, and structural decoupling frequently emerge simultaneously.

Signs of destabilization within such systems increasingly manifest as a decline in relational capacity accompanied by an explosion of simplifying abstraction. Processes become ever more administratively, medially, and functionally captured, while simultaneously losing their concrete relational binding. It is precisely this combination that appears increasingly characteristic of many areas of contemporary societies.

Agency declines within overbureaucratized systems despite expanding architectures of control. Simplified solution models increasingly appear as universal promises of salvation. Concentrations of power and forms of populism gain attractiveness, while democratic processes as open forms of relational negotiation increasingly erode.

Globalization likewise appears ambivalent within this perspective. It increases exchangeability and connectivity, while simultaneously generating new dependencies, structural vulnerability, and the loss of local *Eigenzeit*. Different forms of cultural world-binding can therefore frequently no longer emerge together, but become reduced to adaptation under conditions of accelerated synchronization.

Similar dynamics become visible in diagnostics, administration, and medial world-organization. Categories become simplified, ambiguity reduced, and complex relational processes translated into functional grids. The medial framework through which society perceives reality frequently abstracts and compresses the world so radically that neither real problem dynamics nor possible spaces of solution can remain locally visible at all. Processes are expected to remain globally legible before they are allowed to unfold within concrete world-binding.

The reduction of open difference may increase short-term controllability, yet simultaneously undermine precisely those conditions from which emergence, transformation, and long-term societal future-capability emerge.

7. Subjectivity as Operative Participation

The dynamics of *Eigenzeit* described here do not imply that subjective experience directly mirrors objective reality or that individual perception guarantees ontological truth. Such an assumption would merely remain within representational models and shift the question toward which perspective represents reality “more correctly.” This, however, is precisely not the concern of the present perspective.

What appears remarkable instead is that certain operatoric patterns repeatedly emerge across very different levels of societal reality organization:

- in perception,
- labor,

- temporal organization,
- emergent theory production,
- social conflicts,
- institutional dynamics,
- as well as in models of irreversible form-formation.

This recurrence under variation appears epistemically significant. The observed dynamics therefore no longer appear merely as individual interior perspectives or isolated psychological peculiarities, but increasingly as recursive organizational patterns reproducing themselves across different scales of societal reality organization.

It is precisely this recursive recurrence that forms a central point of departure for the present investigation. The structures described here do not appear merely as metaphorical analogies between different domains. Rather, their repeated reproduction suggests that similar operatoric dynamics may remain active across highly different forms of world-formation. The same tension between stabilization and open condensation becomes visible:

- in conflicts with labor systems,
- in processes of emergent knowledge production,
- in institutional non-fit,
- in cultural reorganization,
- as well as within models of irreversible form-formation themselves.

Within this perspective, subjectivity thereby acquires a different status. It no longer appears primarily as a private interior world or as the representation of an already fully given reality, but as operative participation in world-formation itself. In certain respects, this perspective touches enactivist approaches to cognition (Varela et al., 1991), while shifting them more strongly toward irreversible world-formation and ontological condition-shift. Perception, cognition, and affective organization thereby become not merely reflections of existing order, but forms of relational coupling within ongoing world-organization.

The model developed here therefore does not understand itself as a closed world-formula. Such a formula would be contradictory within its own logic, since every stabilization generates new displacement and no world can remain fully identical with its own conditions. The theory therefore does not describe a final state of stable order, but an open process of condensation within which recursive invariants become visible across different fields of reality.

Against this background, neurodivergent or eigenzeit-bound threshold profiles also acquire a different status. They no longer appear merely as individual deviations within

an otherwise stable system, but potentially as contact zones to suppressed conditions of real emergence. Precisely because certain forms of cognition remain less strongly organized through functional reduction, symbolic stabilization, and simulative adaptation, they make visible structural tensions that are frequently administratively smoothed out or functionally neutralized within highly stabilized societies.

Perhaps this is precisely where their epistemic significance lies: not as privileged access to truth, but as zones of condensation within which structural conflicts of modern reality organization become visible and socially experienceable once again.

It is precisely here, however, that the question emerges of how such forms of emergent participation can be understood at all without once again collapsing back into representational models of immediately “more correct” perception.

8. Emergent Clarification and the Limits of Veridical Models

The perspective developed here must not be misunderstood as claiming that eigenzeit-bound or neurodivergent cognition simply represents reality more directly, more objectively, or with less distortion. Such an interpretation would ultimately remain within representational models and merely shift the presumed quality of representation. What instead appears to reach its limits is the very notion of world-formation as a fully stabilized process.

Concepts such as veridical mapping already described the observation that certain forms of neurodivergent cognition can generate unusually direct pattern couplings and forms of cross-domain structural clarity. Within such models, however, the impression easily arises that hidden orders are merely recognized more precisely or reproduced with less filtering.

The perspective developed here fundamentally shifts this assumption.

Within this framework, structural clarity appears not primarily as the consequence of better representation, but as the result of operative participation in emergent world-formation itself. Immediacy and participation generate proximity, and proximity can intensify contrasts and differences where distance often remains capable only of abstract conceptual clarification, but no longer of existential friction. Patterns are therefore not simply discovered like static objects within an already fully given reality. Structure consequently appears neither fully constructed nor simply objectively given. Reality refers here to a different point of relation.

Within this context, simulation therefore does not merely designate deception, technical virtuality, or digital reproduction. Rather, it refers to the tendency of stabilizing systems to translate relational openness prematurely into reproducible and administratively controllable forms before irreversible displacement can fully unfold. Simulation thereby reproduces patterns without necessarily generating real condition-shift.

Eigenzeit-bound world-binding, by contrast, operates closer to open processes of real condensation. The resulting structural formations often appear unusually direct or radical because they remain less strongly mediated through stabilized representational orders. Their clarity, however, emerges not primarily from unfiltered perception, but from operative participation.

This also shifts the question of truth itself. Within the present perspective, cognition appears neither as pure construction nor as static correspondence to a fully given reality. Truth instead emerges within metastable processes of relational clarification under conditions of ongoing restructuring of conditions.

Perhaps this is precisely the decisive difference between simulation-based stabilization and eigenzeit-bound world-binding: while stabilizing systems attempt to translate world into reproducible representation, eigenzeit-bound processes remain more closely coupled to that open emergence within which world itself is continuously brought forth.

9. Simulation, Stabilization, and the Loss of World

The conflicts described thus far cannot be understood exclusively as problems of individual adaptation or institutional malfunction. Rather, they point toward a deeper transformation within modern reality organization itself. It becomes increasingly apparent that modern societies organize reality through representation, stabilization, and functional legibility. Reality is preferentially translated into forms that remain:

- comparable,
- administratively manageable,
- predictable,
- reproducible,
- and as reversible as possible.

Precisely from this, however, a fundamental tension emerges. Real world-formation may not operate primarily through stabilization, but through irreversible condensation within open states of difference. Modern systems attempt to render complexity controllable by translating it into categories, diagnoses, models, data spaces, or functional roles. World thereby becomes increasingly simulatable, while simultaneously losing precisely that openness within which new emergence can arise at all.

Within this context, simulation therefore does not merely designate technical virtuality or digital reproduction. Rather, it refers to a more general form of societal reality organization within which stability gradually becomes more important than real world-binding. Representation increasingly begins to replace direct relational coupling. Processes are expected to remain legible before they can fully unfold. Conflicts are to be

administratively neutralized before new structure can emerge. Labor is expected to become measurable before its long-term world-effects become visible.

This dynamic now manifests itself across highly different societal domains. Administration increasingly operates through standardized categories and statistical comparability. Diagnostics reduces complex lived realities to functional legibility. Platform economies reorganize social relations according to algorithmic predictability. Science increasingly shifts knowledge production into project-based third-party funding architectures within which what can count as relevant knowledge must already be formulable in advance. Even cultural production is increasingly organized according to visibility, market compatibility, and administrative funding logic.

Precisely within such systems, peculiar reversals emerge. Processes requiring real openness, crisis-capacity, or long-term condensation come under permanent pressure toward premature stabilization. Conflicts are to be avoided before new relational order can emerge. Errors appear primarily as disturbances rather than as necessary conditions of recursive reorganization. Systems originally intended to generate stability thereby begin to destabilize precisely those conditions from which real future-capability emerges.

For open emergence requires:

- irreversible time,
- real difference,
- crisis-capacity,
- non-identity,
- as well as the possibility of structural displacement.

It is precisely these conditions that become increasingly reduced within highly stabilized systems. Yet this tension is far more conflictual than Hartmut Rosa's concept of resonance would suggest. Resonance between these two modes is not what leads toward resolution. Rather, what becomes necessary is the transformation of foundational assumptions and structural dominances themselves.

This dynamic becomes especially visible within algorithmic and generative systems. AI models operate predominantly through statistical stabilization, pattern reproduction, and the condensation of past data spaces. They generate high coherence without necessarily producing real condition-shift. The result is a form of simulative intelligence capable of increasingly reproducing, organizing, and administering world, while simultaneously developing difficulties in dealing with irreversible emergence.

Within such systems, it begins to appear as though *Eigenzeit* were no longer necessary — as though the entire world could be reconstructed and generated from information alone. This is a fatal illusion. The simplifying tendencies of many such systems render *Eigenzeit* itself referentially invisible and reproductively seemingly unnecessary. Friction losses appear as gains. What disappears instead is lived complexity and connection to

suppressed realities that must be lived through in *Eigenzeit* in order to operate according to their own logic.

As a consequence, forms of *eigenzeit*-bound cognition and world-binding frequently appear paradoxical within dominant orders. On the one hand, they seem disruptive, incommunicable, or dysfunctional. On the other hand, it is precisely from these same dynamics that new theoretical, cultural, or relational formations often emerge. Stabilization societies thereby depend upon exactly those forms of openness that they simultaneously struggle to integrate.

The tension described here therefore concerns not merely individual neurodivergent persons. It may instead point toward a broader historical transformation of modern societies themselves. The more systems expand their capacities for stabilization, predictability, and simulative control, the greater the danger may become that they simultaneously lose their capacity for real world-formation.

The result is the possibility of a culture that simulates with ever greater precision while the conditions of emergent future gradually disappear. World remains administratively organizable, statistically reproducible, and functionally controllable, yet increasingly loses precisely that irreversible openness from which new relational order can emerge at all.

Within this perspective, the conflict between *eigenzeit*-bound world-binding and stabilizing systems therefore no longer appears merely as a marginal phenomenon of neurodivergent existence, but as the expression of a deeper civilizational problem: the progressive decoupling between reality and its administrative, functional, and simulative representations. Paradoxically, research itself is by no means immune to this process.

10. Neurodivergence as Historical Contact Zone

Against this background, the question of the societal significance of neurodivergent or *eigenzeit*-bound forms of world-binding also shifts fundamentally. The present investigation explicitly does not argue that neurodivergent people are inherently “more correct,” morally superior, or epistemically infallible. Nor does it attempt to construct a romanticized counterfigure to modern society. Such simplifications would merely return to stable identity models and thereby obscure the actual dynamics at stake.

What appears remarkable, however, is that certain edge profiles repeatedly enter into conflict within highly stabilized societies precisely at those points where real openness, irreversible condensation, and emergent world-formation become visible. It is precisely through this that they may acquire a particular historical significance. Not because they stand outside societal processes, but because structural tensions within modern reality organization condense especially clearly within their conflicts.

Similar experiences can also be observed among other groups situated at social or structural margins, where difference itself becomes a formative condition of lived existence.

Within this perspective, eigenzeit-bound or emergent forms of world-binding therefore appear less as isolated deviations within an otherwise stable order than as contact zones to suppressed conditions of real emergence. Precisely where dominant systems attempt to:

- administratively reduce difference,
- render processes functionally legible,
- neutralize conflicts prematurely,
- and translate world into reproducible informational spaces,

certain forms of neurodivergent world-binding remain more closely operatively coupled to irreversible openness.

This does not mean, however, that such forms of world-binding are automatically productive, harmonious, or socially integrable. Quite the opposite. Their proximity to open condensation frequently generates:

- instability,
- overload,
- crises,
- functional inoperability,
- conflicts with labor systems,
- as well as profound existential strain.

Yet precisely therein may also lie their epistemic relevance. Highly stabilized systems tend to render their own limits invisible. Within their own representational logic, they increasingly appear self-evident, without alternative, and objective. Only where particular forms of world-binding collide with these structures do suppressed conditions of real world-formation become visible again.

Conflicts involving labor, administration, diagnostics, or social integration thereby acquire a different character. They no longer appear merely as individual failures within functional systems, but increasingly as indicators of deeper structural incompatibilities between different modes of societal reality organization.

This becomes especially visible where highly complex emergent capacities coexist simultaneously with functional inoperability. Modern systems struggle to interpret such constellations because their models of productivity, rationality, and competence remain

predominantly dependent upon stable representation, continuous reproducibility, and administrative comparability.

Precisely from this, paradoxical situations emerge. Individuals who collapse under conditions of functional adaptation may simultaneously generate new theoretical formations, relational recouplings, or long-term cultural condensations. Stabilization systems frequently interpret the breakdown of functional legibility as a general lack of capability, while the actual dynamic may lie precisely in a different form of world-binding.

Within the perspective developed here, neurodivergence therefore appears neither primarily as a deficit model nor merely as an identity-political category. Rather, it may point toward different operatoric modes of societal world-organization. This also extends far beyond Baron-Cohen's concept of "pattern seekers," since neurodivergent people are more than useful pattern-detection instruments. Certain edge profiles may preserve capacities that increasingly disappear within highly stabilized systems:

- openness toward structural displacement,
- visibility of suppressed difference,
- emergent recoupling of separated domains,
- crisis-processing through relational reorganization,
- as well as long-term condensation under conditions of irreversible transformation.

Perhaps it is precisely here that the fundamental historical tension of modern societies emerges. The more systems optimize themselves toward stabilization, simulation, and functional reproducibility, the more difficult the integration of those forms of world-binding operating closer to open emergence becomes. At the same time, however, precisely these forms of world-binding may remain necessary in order to sustain long-term future-capability at all.

From this perspective, the conflicts surrounding neurodivergent liminal profiles may therefore appear not merely as marginal phenomena of modern societies, but as early indicators of a deeper civilizational crisis: the growing difficulty of highly stabilized systems to continue integrating irreversible openness, real difference, and emergent world-formation.

11. Conclusion

The present investigation does not understand itself as a closed model of cognition, world, or society. Nor does it attempt to formulate a universal theory of human perception. Rather, the dynamics described here represent an attempt to make visible

recursive invariants that repeatedly reproduce themselves across different levels of societal reality organization:

- in labor,
- temporal organization,
- institutional conflicts,
- emergent theory production,
- neurodivergent experience,
- as well as in models of irreversible world-formation.

It is precisely this recurrence under variation that forms the actual point of departure of the investigation. The patterns described here no longer appear merely as psychological peculiarities or subjective narratives, but increasingly as indications of deeper tensions within modern reality organization itself.

Modern societies increasingly tend to define reality through stabilization. From this perspective, the conflict between eigenzeit-bound world-binding and stabilizing systems therefore no longer appears merely as an individual problem of adaptation, but as the expression of different modes of societal reality production.

As a consequence, conflicts emerge that within existing orders frequently become visible only as dysfunction, inoperability, or social maladjustment. At the same time, however, it becomes apparent that these very same dynamics often generate new forms of theory, world-relation, cultural condensation, and societal reorganization.

Stabilization societies thereby enter into a paradoxical condition. They frequently destabilize precisely those forms of openness that they may ultimately require in order to preserve real future-capability at all.

The perspective developed here explicitly does not claim that neurodivergent boundary profiles are automatically “more correct” or possess privileged access to reality. What appears decisive instead is that certain forms of world-binding may render visible structural tensions that increasingly remain concealed within highly stabilized systems. Precisely through this, conflicts involving labor, administration, diagnostics, or social integration may acquire a significance extending beyond individual biographies.

Perhaps such conflicts do not merely mark marginal phenomena of modern societies, but transition zones within a broader historical displacement in which highly stabilized systems increasingly struggle to integrate irreversible openness, real difference, and emergent world-formation.

It may ultimately be here that the deeper significance of eigenzeit-bound threshold profiles emerges: not as final answers to the crises of modern societies, but as zones of condensation within which suppressed conditions of world-formation become visible once again.

Such a movement would represent a reconnection of society to a space of impulses capable of generating a different form of binding: less power, more relation.

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